

NOT DENIAL, BUT INCREASING SOFT CLIMATE SCEPTICISM

**Why democratic parties in Europe
can and must act now**

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d|part

Table of Contents

	<u>Executive Summary</u>	<u>3</u>
1	<u>Introduction</u>	<u>4</u>
2	<u>No climate denialism, but increasing attribution and impact scepticism</u>	<u>5</u>
3	<u>Party-cues and ideological views matter more than economic situation and outlook</u>	<u>9</u>
4	<u>Views of society, the state and political disenfranchisement shape climate views</u>	<u>12</u>
5	<u>Conclusion</u>	<u>17</u>
	<u>Authors</u>	<u>19</u>
	<u>d part</u>	<u>20</u>

Executive Summary

Public awareness of the climate crisis remains high across Europe, yet commitment to ambitious climate action is weakening. This report, based on representative survey data from Germany, France, Italy, Poland, and Sweden, reveals a troubling shift: while outright climate denialism remains marginal, softer forms of climate scepticism—doubts about the extent of human responsibility and the necessity for transformative action—are on the rise. These trends have not emerged in isolation but reflect how far-right and populist actors have successfully advanced these narratives of scepticism, undermining the urgency for comprehensive action.

Across the five countries studied, there has been a decline in support for far-reaching measures to stop climate change. Instead, more people now prioritize adaptation over mitigation, reflecting a reduced perception of urgency for action and rising impact scepticism. At the same time, there has been a notable increase in attribution scepticism, with fewer people correctly identifying human activity as the primary driver of climate change. These shifts, while not outright climate denialism, weaken public commitment to transformative, ambitious climate policies.

While economic concerns might seem an intuitive explanation for these shifting attitudes, the data suggest otherwise. Personal financial situations and outlooks are not strongly related to climate scepticism. Instead, ideological factors—especially far-right attitudes—play a more central role. People who support far-right parties or hold far-right attitudes are more likely to exhibit both impact and attribution scepticism. This pattern is particularly evident in Germany and Sweden, where soft climate scepticism is linked to broader sense of political disaffection, distrust in public institutions and media, and scepticism towards state intervention. These findings suggest that far-right actors have successfully integrated climate scepticism into their wider ideological framework, embedding it within broader critiques of political and media institutions.

As a result, countering these narratives requires more than simply presenting scientific facts or emphasizing economic benefits of climate action. To address this challenge, democratic political actors must resist the temptation to accommodate or echo sceptical narratives and far-right talking points. Instead, they should reinforce clear, proactive messaging about the need for climate action, ensuring that it aligns with broader democratic and economic policies. Strengthening public engagement in climate debates must go beyond countering misinformation—it must foster genuine political participation and rebuild trust in democratic institutions.

Key findings and conclusion

No widespread climate denial, but growing soft scepticism: While full-scale climate change denial remains a minority position, more people now express impact and attribution scepticism, undermining the necessity and feasibility of implementing ambitious climate action.

Far-right narratives matter more than economic factors: Climate scepticism is more strongly correlated with ideological positions, specifically far right attitudes, rather than personal financial situations or outlook, indicating a politically driven shift in attitudes to soft scepticism.

Disaffection with politics and low trust in media fuels scepticism: People who feel disengaged or distrustful of political institutions are more likely to adopt soft forms of climate scepticism. Similarly, those who distrust public broadcasters are significantly more likely to question the scientific consensus on climate change, underscoring the need to reinforce credible information sources.

Democratic parties must take a clear stand: Engaging with climate scepticism should not mean accommodating or echoing far-right narratives but instead reinforcing a strong, evidence-based and solutions-oriented climate discourse connected to broader democratic and economic policies.

Tailored, context-specific strategies needed: Given the variations across countries, responses must be adapted to national political and social contexts to effectively engage different segments of the population.

1. Introduction

Awareness of global heating overall has reached high levels in many countries¹. However, that awareness does not automatically translate to greater support for transformative climate actions in publics. Indeed, as the scientific consensus on the human-made climate crisis grew, populist- and far-right groups trying to prevent comprehensive action adjusted their tactics. Rather than promoting outright challenges to the existence of climate change, they shifted narratives to increase scepticisms about the scale of likely impacts from that change and the scope of human influence on it.² Their goal was to reach people who were aware of rising temperatures and human impact on this process, but who were unsure to what extent human or natural processes were responsible and, additionally, were not convinced that their own lives would be majorly affected. This substantial group of people, who did not subscribe fully to the scientific consensus but who also did not deny climate change, were the target group amongst whom populist- and far-right actors tried to increase scepticisms – with the goal to create a wedge between them and those committed to strong climate action.

Alarmingly, these efforts seem to have been partially successful. Using representative survey data from five European countries (Germany, France, Italy, Poland and Sweden)³, this report outlines how impact and attribution scepticism about the climate crisis has indeed increased. We examine which groups are disproportionately likely to adopt softer and harder forms of scepticism and find that far-right attitudes and political party cues matter more than people’s financial situation or their economic outlook. Additionally, views about politics and the role of the state, in particular political disaffection, attitudes towards state intervention and trust in public broadcasters are linked to climate change scepticism – but more in some countries than others. We find ideological and attitudinal wedges particularly large in Germany and Sweden across most domains, while differences are more nuanced in the other countries. Building on those findings, we present six conclusions directed to actors working to counter climate crisis scepticism.

1 UNDP & University of Oxford (2021). People’s climate vote – Results. Available from <https://www.undp.org/publications/peoples-climate-vote> (accessed 12/09/2024).


2 Counterpoint & OSEPI (2021). Green wedge? Mapping dissent against climate policy in Europe. London: Counterpoint. Available from https://counterpoint.uk.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Green_Wedge_Counterpoint_OSEPI.pdf (accessed 12/09/2024).

3 Data was collected between 10 April and 2 May 2024 through an online survey designed by d|part and conducted by SAGO. Using a set of main and cross-quotas the survey delivered a sample representative of the population aged 18 to 80 in the five countries in terms of demographic and socio-economic characteristics. Minor deviations from population parameters were adjusted using weights. The total sample size was 7819. For full details on the methodology, please consult the methods note in (pp. 32) from the main report of the project, available here: http://wordpress.dpart.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/United-In-A-Bleak-Outlook_Full-Report.pdf. Comparisons from 2020 stem from a representative survey in a different project. Details on that data collection can be obtained here: <https://www.dpart.org/en/projects/climate-crisis-messages>.

2. No climate denialism, but increasing attribution and impact scepticism

Climate denialism continues to be a minority view held by at most around 10 per cent of respondents in each of the countries studied. The vast majority of people thinks that the climate is changing and that we need to respond to it. However, in all five countries, we have seen a shift in emphasis (figure 1). In 2020, there was a majority or clear plurality (in Sweden) saying that “we should do everything we can to stop climate change.” In 2024 significantly fewer people hold this view, however. More have shifted into a more moderate response mode, saying that “we should adapt to climate change, so that we can live well with a changed climate in the future.” The change is rather dramatic in some countries. In Germany and Poland support for strong action to stop climate change dropped from 64 to 49 percent within those four years. France and Italy saw a reduction of just under ten percentage points and in Sweden there are now slightly more people (44%) emphasising an adaptation focus than deeper action (41%). This rise in impact scepticism that does not deny climate change per se reflects efforts by multiple campaigns, especially from the populist- and far-right to demobilise climate action, reducing a sense of urgency for action within countries.


Figure 1: Views about action on climate change 2020-2024, by country (in %) , N=1968



Question wording: “Taken together, what should people do to respond to climate change overall?” (%ages missing to 100: don’t know/no answer)

Reasons for this are likely mixed. For some, it may reflect a genuine increase in impact scepticism, particularly the belief that they personally would not be affected by rising temperatures in a major way. For others, it may reflect a sense of not being able to do much – either reflecting a sense of disillusionment and belief that adaptation is the only realistic option or an echoing of populist narratives downplaying the responsibility of wealthier nations in this regard.

Figure 2: Climate change attribution views 2020-2024, by country (in %), N=1968



Question wording: "Do you think that climate change is caused by natural processes, human activity, or both?" (%ages missing to 100: don't know/no answer)

However, and potentially even more worryingly, we also see a significant increase in attribution scepticism in four out of the five countries (excepting France). We had already seen in 2020 that many people, while acknowledging the reality of climate change, were not able to correctly attribute it predominantly to human activity⁴. This situation has worsened (figure 2). While 58 percent of German respondents in 2020 said that human activity was mostly or entirely the reason for climate change, this has dropped to 47 percent in 2024. We have seen similar drops in Sweden (55% to 44%), Poland (47% to 37%) and Italy (62% to 55%).


Populist- and far-right campaigns that tried to establish relativising narratives about current developments being similar to past changes in the climate and downplaying human contributions, seem to have had some success in increasing attribution scepticism within the last years. This is particularly worrying, as we know that levels of knowledge about the foundations of the climate crisis are strongly associated with attitudes towards climate transition policies⁵ and, more broadly, economic policies.⁶

4 Eichhorn, J., Molthof, L. & Nicke, S. (2020). From climate change awareness to climate crisis action. Public perceptions in Europe and the United States. Berlin & Brussels: d|part & OSEPI. Available from <https://dpart.org/publications/comparative-report/> (accessed 12/09/2024).

5 Eichhorn, J., Gimeno Solaz, A. & White, P. (2022). Shifting paradigms. Public perceptions of economic policy in shaping the climate crisis. Berlin & Brussels: d|part & OSEPI. Available from <https://dpart.org/publications/shifting-paradigms/> (accessed 12/09/2024).

6 Eichhorn, J., Thomet, J. & Gimeno Solaz, A. (2024). School is not enough: The role of climate-specific knowledge for transformative climate policy and economic system preferences. *Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences*. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s13412-024-00953-x>.

Figure 3: Frequencies of combined impact and attribution scepticism types (in %), across countries (with countries weighted equally), N=1968




Country samples were all weighted to be equal in size for analyses in which results are presented jointly across all five countries.

Taken together, there is only about one third of people across the five countries who show no attribution or impact scepticism. They correctly identify human activity as the main driver of the climate crisis and they think that we should do everything to stop it. Otherwise, attitude profiles are spread across a range of quite different combinations of scepticisms (figure 3). Hard scepticism is a minority view. There are 12 percent of respondents who suggest adaptation is enough or no action is needed and who also think climate change is predominantly a natural process. Some people only fall into one scepticism group: 14 percent correctly attribute climate change to human activity, but favour adaptation or no action (potentially because of a scepticism of what actions could achieve). About one third percent attribute climate change equally to human and natural activities and while most of them do not favour major action against the climate crisis, a significant minority does.⁷

While there is some overlap in scepticisms, this suggests that we should investigate both as distinct, but in conjunction, to better understand why people may subscribe partially or fully to one or both types of scepticism. While we see that people who call for action to stop climate change are more likely to also correctly attribute climate change predominantly to human activity (figure 4) in all countries (ranging from 54 percent in Poland to 68 percent in Italy and Germany), the relationship is far from comprehensive. There is a significant minority who do not emphasise strong action on the climate crisis despite them correctly identifying human activity as the cause (ranging from 21 percent in Poland to 36 percent in France).


⁷ Ideally, we would differentiate the group that does not want to take any action from the group that favours adaptation efforts. However, the “no action” group is overall too small to meaningfully analyse in its own right. Given that we see significant differences to the “Climate change must be stopped” group, the contrast nevertheless demonstrates strongly how people with softer or harder forms of impact scepticism have different views to those who emphasise the urgency of action.

Figure 4: Attribution scepticism by impact scepticism, and by country (in %), N=1968



Looking at both scepticisms jointly thus enables us to investigate people’s attitudes on the climate crisis in more detail. We cannot reduce people’s scepticism profiles to impact or attribution scepticism alone, if we want to understand how they engage with debates about the climate crisis. Both are associated with how concerned people are about climate change as a societal issue (figure 5). Unsurprisingly, across all levels of attribution scepticism, people who say that we should stop climate change are also more likely to express concern about the climate crisis. At the same time, the more people attribute climate change to human activity, regardless of their view on the action that is required, the more likely they are to express concern. When both scepticisms coincide, the differences manifest the most. Amongst people who generally think action to stop climate change must be taken, but who incorrectly attribute it equally to human and natural activity, 77 percent still feel concerned about it. Amongst those who hold the same relativising attribution view, but also think that adaptation is enough or no action needed, just under half show the same concern.

Figure 5: Concern about climate change by impact and attribution scepticism, across all countries (with countries weighted equally) , N=1968




Question wording: “What are your current sentiments regarding the following societal issues – Climate change?”

But what might be the drivers of those different scepticism profiles? We might think that scepticisms are mostly driven by people’s personal circumstances. Alternatively, political views could play a role – which would provide further evidence to suggest that indeed ideologically motivated efforts from populist- and far-right forces have been successful. The next section will examine that question.

3. Party-cues and ideological views matter more than economic situation and outlook

Figure 6: Impact and attribution scepticism profiles by financial situation (with countries weighted equally), N=1968




Question wording: “What is your current financial situation?”

Levels of impact and attribution scepticism are fairly similar across different financial situations people find themselves in (figure 6). This is not simply a story of richer versus poorer respondents. Those who describe their situation as precarious or poor are overall even slightly more likely (66%) to say that climate change should be stopped than those who are at least describing themselves as financially comfortable (58%). Generally, differences are not large though.

Crucially, the same holds even when we ask about people’s personal economic outlook (figure 7). Regardless of whether people think that their financial situation will improve, worsen or stay the same, levels of climate impact and attribution scepticism are at very similar levels. While it is sometimes alleged that climate action is less supported by people with fewer financial means, we find no evidence that would suggest that scepticism patterns align with socio-economic situation or outlook.


Figure 7: Impact and attribution scepticism profiles by expectations about future financial situation (with countries weighted equally), N=1968



Question wording: "Looking ahead to the next 3-5 years, how do you think your personal financial will develop? Do you think it will get better, stay the same, or get worse?"

In contrast, ideological views are strongly linked to climate scepticisms. People who want more impactful action on climate change are less likely to express far-right attitudes (figure 8). Additionally, both amongst people with and without impact scepticism, the more respondents attribute climate change to natural activities, the more likely they are to hold far-right view. This is noteworthy, because the far-right attitudes asked about in eight statements across different issue dimensions have no direct link to climate crisis policy. Instead, they include racism, antisemitism, national chauvinism, authoritarianism, and gender conservatism. Seeing the link between climate scepticisms and those attitudes suggests that impact and attribution scepticism are not simply expressions of specific views on climate debates, but connected to broader ideological positions.


Figure 8: Far-right attitudes by impact and attribution scepticism profiles (with countries weighted equally), N=1968



For details on the operationalisation of far-right attitudes, please see the associated note on the project website at: <https://www.dpart.org/en/projects/understanding-socio-economic-realities-and-political-perspectives-in-the-european-union>.

These, however, do not exist only ideologically. Indeed, they appear connected to institutional actors: supporters of far-right parties, compared to both those who support non-far-right parties and those who do not feel affinity to any political parties, are more likely to express impact and attribution scepticism on climate change (figure 9). Taken together, these findings provide further indications that populist- and far-right actors were indeed successful in installing explicit linkages between climate debates and their wider agendas – as analysts had warned would occur.⁸

Figure 9: Impact and attribution scepticism profiles by political party affinity (with countries weighted equally), N=1968




For details on the classification of parties as far-right, please see the methods note of the main report (p. 33): http://wordpress.dpart.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/06/United-In-A-Bleak-Outlook_Full-Report.pdf.

While this general pattern holds across countries, the extent of it varies greatly. Far-right party affinity is most strongly related to climate scepticisms in Germany (figure 10). Only 7 percent of far-right supporters (mostly of the AfD) do not show any impact or attribution scepticism – compared to 41 percent amongst people supporting non-far-right parties. The gap is also fairly pronounced in Sweden and Poland, where far-right supporters are roughly twice as likely as those supporting other parties to show at least one scepticism. While the gap also exists in Italy and France, it is smaller there.

⁸ Counterpoint (2021), see above.

Figure 10: Non-scepticism (impact and attribution) by political party affinity and by country, N=1968



Attribution and impact scepticism do not appear to be found more amongst people with a certain economic situation or outlook, but are much more prevalent with those holding far-right attitudes and who support far-right parties. In the five countries studied, it seems that one's personal position is less important than the cues one takes from political parties and how they align with ideological predispositions. This is very concerning. It suggests that populist- and far-right actors have been partially successful in developing climate discussions into a domain of their discourse in alignment with other parts of their belief system. Countering these scepticisms thus requires a strategy to break those ideological cues and linkages.


4. Views of society, the state and political disenfranchisement shape climate views

In addition to far-right attitudes and party affinity, there are also other attitudinal perspectives that are less partisan in nature, but associated with climate scepticisms. They relate to views about politics and the role of the state. However, those associations are most pronounced for specific questions about how people perceive political institutions and processes. It is not simply about an overall positive or negative view of society. People with different degrees of climate scepticism on average come to rather similar assessments of how their respective countries' societies are currently doing (figure 11).

There is no marked difference between those who think we must act to stop climate change and those who think we just need to adapt or do nothing. For attribution scepticism, there is a small difference, with those who think climate change is roughly equally caused by human and natural activities a little more positive in their view of the overall political, economic and societal situation. But the differences are not large. The outlier is the group of people who think climate change should be stopped, but who think it is largely caused by natural activities. Their view of the current situation is the most positive – but this group is also by

far the smallest (6 percent). These findings are particularly interesting considering that we saw earlier how scepticism was linked to far-right views in many instances. This suggests that the interplay between far-right views and climate crisis scepticism is about more than general dissatisfaction expressed through, for example, a right-wing protest orientation.


Figure 11: Evaluation of state of society by impact and attribution scepticism profiles (with countries weighted equally) , N=1968



Question wording: "In general, when you think of the overall political, economic and societal situation in [COUNTRY of respondent], how would you rate the current state of society on a scale of 1 (very negative) to 10 (very positive)?"

However, we do see some marked differences when we ask about people’s political efficacy (figure 12). Those who think that it is pointless to participate in politics, as nothing really changes, are less likely to show no scepticisms (29%) than those who feel more positive about politics (41%).


Figure 12: Impact and attribution scepticism profiles by disaffection with politics (with countries weighted equally)



Question wording: "It is pointless for me to participate in politics; nothing ever changes anyway."


Indeed, disaffection with politics in some countries is strongly linked to climate scepticism. Once again, the impact is most pronounced in Germany, where those who feel political disaffected are only about half as likely to not hold any climate scepticisms, as those who do not agree that participation in politics is futile (figure 13). The same pattern is found in the other countries, too, but to a lesser degree. In Poland and Sweden, those who feel disaffected are about two thirds as likely to not show any scepticisms.

Figure 13: Non-scepticism (impact and attribution) by political disaffection and by country, N=1968



The relationship goes beyond general disaffection, however. Climate scepticisms are found more amongst people with certain views about the role of the state vis-à-vis the private sector in policy making. While one's personal economic situation were not a key differentiator, one's beliefs about how social and economic policy should be shaped, appears to matter (figure 14). People who think that inequality in society is not a problem or should largely be dealt with using market instruments are more likely to have climate sceptical views than those who think the state should intervene more directly. Amongst market-focussed respondents, only 38 percent think that climate change is predominantly caused by human action – compared to 52 percent amongst state-interventionist focussed people. Additionally, market-focussed respondents are also less likely to think that we should act to stop climate change. So in addition to far-right ideological cues, we also see economic beliefs to be linked to people's degree of climate change scepticism.

Figure 14: Impact and attribution scepticism profiles by views about role of the state in addressing inequality (with countries weighted equally), N=1968



Question wording: "Many people are concerned that the distribution of wealth in [COUNTRY of respondent] has become very unequal. Which of the following comes closest to your own view about what should ideally be done about inequality, if anything at all?" (Market-based options: "Nothing should be done, Simply make sure the economy grows", "Make it easier for individuals to invest their money (e.g. in shares)"; State-interventionist options: "Increase taxes paid by those who earn most", "Provide more services free of charge", "Fundamentally change the economic system to redistribute wealth", "Provide every person in [COUNTRY] with a Universal Basic Income")

Once again, we see variation across countries, however, and in a different way than for political disaffection. In this case, in Poland and France there are hardly any differences, while we once again see that in Germany and Sweden those favouring a state-interventionist approach are about twice as likely to not hold any scepticisms, compared to those embracing market-based approaches (figure 15). Additionally, there is also a strong difference in Italy.

Figure 15: Non-scepticism (impact and attribution) by views about role of the state in addressing inequality and by country, N=1968






Figure 16: Impact and attribution scepticism profiles by trust in public broadcasters (with countries weighted equally) , N=1968



Question wording: "For each of the following institutions, please indicate to what extent you trust or distrust them: Public Broadcasting Media".

However, the extent differs greatly by country here, too (figure 17). While there is no marked gap in Italy, in Sweden and Germany those who distrust their public broadcasters are less than half as likely to not show attribution or impact scepticism. To engage those with sceptical attitudes in those countries might be a particular challenge, given the importance of ideological perspectives seen.

Figure 17: Non-scepticism (impact and attribution) by trust in public broadcasters and by country, N=1968



5. Conclusion

The majority of people in Germany, France, Italy, Poland and Sweden recognize the reality of climate change, acknowledge the human impact on it and think that actions are necessary to address it. Outright climate denialism is a minority view. Therefore, as others have pointed out⁹, there is no widespread climate backlash in the comprehensive sense that societal views have turned against climate action altogether. However, over the past four years, there have been substantial but more nuanced changes. These shifts are more in degree than in outright opposition. Compared to 2020, across all five countries in 2024, fewer people intuitively think that we should act transformatively to stop climate change but rather adapt to a changed climate. Even more worryingly, except for France, in all countries the number of people who correctly attribute climate change predominantly to human activity has decreased, while more people now believe that climate change is equally caused by human and natural activity.

This is highly problematic, as we know that understanding the fundamental causes and mechanisms of climate change is strongly related to people's support for transformative climate policies and greater state action in the economy more broadly. While the changes from 2020 are subtle, they are moving in the wrong direction, if the goal is to see publics become more supportive of comprehensive policies addressing the climate crisis. Increasing this "softer" form of impact and attribution scepticism to reduce public support for action has been a strategic objective of populist- and far-right actors. It appears they have at least partially succeeded.

Indeed, we find strong indications that climate scepticism is linked to positions held by populist – and far-right actors. While people's financial situation and outlook are not strongly correlated with their degree of climate scepticism overall, their party-political preferences and ideological views are. People who support far-right parties and those who express more far-right attitudes, are much more likely to exhibit both impact and attribution scepticism regarding the climate crisis. This holds across all countries studied, but varies in extent, suggesting that the specific nature of far-right parties and the respective country context shape how views are connected.

In some countries, the divide between climate change sceptical parts of the population and those who do not hold those views is quite pronounced and spans across many attitudinal domains. This is the case in Germany and Sweden. In addition to holding far-right attitudes, climate change sceptics in both countries also feel politically very disaffected and tend to distrust public broadcasters. Also, they favour market-based solutions to deal with economic inequality. While sceptics show greater disaffection with politics in all countries, in Poland they do not show distinct preferences regarding state- or market-based solutions, but also trust public broadcasters less. In Italy it is the other way around, while in France, the attitudinal differences between sceptics and non-sceptics are the smallest.

9 Abou-Chadi, T., Jansen, J., Kollberg, M. & Redeker, N. (2024). Debunking the Backlash: Uncovering European Voters' Climate Preferences. Berlin: Hertie School Jacques Delors Centre. Available from: https://www.delorscentre.eu/fileadmin/2_Research/1_About_our_research/2_Research_centres/6_Jacques_Delors_Centre/Publications/20240307_Debunking_the_Backlash_Abou-Chadi_Janssen_Kollberg_Redecker.pdf (accessed 12/09/2024).

Six important consequences follow:

1. Given the increase in impact and attribution scepticism regarding the climate crisis, there is an urgent need for concerted and explicit efforts to counteract this specific dynamic immediately.
2. Since scepticism is not merely linked to people's economic situation or outlook, it is not sufficient to simply argue that transformative climate policies will lead to positive economic payoffs. While output legitimacy remains important, it is not sufficient to effectively counter efforts advancing impact and attribution scepticism.
3. Acknowledging the link between climate crisis scepticism, far-right attitudes and party cues, it is essential for other political parties to avoid echoing the argumentative lines presented by the populist- and far-right. Otherwise, they risk to help establish them even more within mainstream debates.
4. As most people believe that human activity causes climate change and support action addressing it, democratic political parties must develop or maintain proactive narratives about climate action that align with their broader outlook. De-emphasising or relativising the need for action is not a strategically smart option – as it is likely to feed into the narratives established by the populist- and far-right.
5. Considering the link between disaffection with politics and climate scepticism, public engagement on the climate crisis must go beyond correcting misinformation. It should genuinely think about how to embed democratic practices that involve people in ways that rebuilds trust in the value of political engagement.
6. Recognizing the significant differences in attitudinal profiles between countries, we need context-specific strategies for engagement that consider people's views on politics, the state and information sources. Understanding better how people precisely make sense of debates on the climate crisis in their respective national context should be a priority.

Authors

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Jan co-founded d|part and is a partner and research director of the think tank. In his research, Jan works with both large representative survey data and qualitative methods such as focus groups, small group interviews and expert interviews. He often does this in comparative projects across several countries and with the following focal points: Youth participation, economic understandings and dissonances between elite and popular perspectives.

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d | part is a non-profit, independent and non-partisan think tank. The focus of our work is to research and support different forms of political participation.

With our research, we seek to contribute to a democratic society in which all people can voice their opinion as well as participate and contribute to political processes. Thus, we need to better understand, strengthen, and enhance political participation.

In our work, we use evidence-based research and scientific expertise to gain new insights to inform policy and social debates and to actively disseminate to different target groups. These include state institutions, politicians, and political parties as well as civil society organisations, the media, and public administrations. Especially, we want to engage with and advocate with our research for social groups that are otherwise reached less frequently or with greater difficulty by “the politics”.

We have particular expertise in working on the participation of social groups that are often politically underrepresented. As such, we focus on addressing and enhancing the political participation of young people, people with migration biographies, and people with lower socio-economic status.

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Published in February 2025

© d|part. Skalitzer Straße 33, 10999 Berlin, Germany

Supported by a grant from the Open Society Foundation gGmbH in cooperation with the Open Society Foundations.

Further information can be found on the project website <https://www.dpart.org/en/projects/understanding-socio-economic-realities-and-political-perspectives-in-the-european-union>