IN THE GRIP OF AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM

POLISH ATTITUDES TO AN OPEN SOCIETY

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Poland's open society has been built on the legacy and experiences of the Solidarność movement. Back in 1980-81, it brought together some 10 million Poles protesting the poor living standards under communist rule.

That was almost 40 years ago. Now Poles are asking themselves whether the post-Solidarity and post-communist social and political transformation has been successful. Where are the solid achievements of Solidarity, that island of social progress in the grey seas of communism?

Our report tries to answer this question, and at the same time examines the current state of Poland's open society. We look at three main areas: Polish attitudes towards cultural diversity; Polish attitudes towards liberal democracy; and Polish people's willingness to sacrifice democratic rules for better living standards.

Our research shows that, depending on their political leanings, Poles have very different views on cultural diversity. The same goes for their satisfaction with the current political situation and the Polish government's constitutional policies.

Attitudes towards democratic values tend to be complex because of the widespread embrace of a majoritarian definition of democracy and a lack of understanding of minority rights. We also found that the Catholic church's strong presence in the public sphere does little to strengthen support for liberal democracy.

Our most alarming observation concerns younger generations - the 18-34-year-olds who, surprisingly, tend to be the least supportive of an open society. They are less open than their elders to cultural diversity and are the only social group that considers living standards to be more important than democratic values.

Poland's society and its political leaders were unable to hand down Solidarity's spirit of tolerance and dialogue, together with its sense of community. New solutions are therefore needed if Poland is to be prepared to meet the challenges of a multilateral, interdependent and diversified world.

INTRODUCTION

The political changes that took place in Poland a few years ago, under the influence of global geopolitical and economic developments, were barely anticipated. Despite unprecedented economic growth, new authoritarian and populist parties and movements gained power.

The advent of authoritarian populism - when the conservative Law and Justice party (PiS) came to power in 2015 - has dealt a severe blow to Poland's democratic institutions.

There are many explanations for the current political situation. Some experts say that "economic anxiety" is not an adequate reason for Poland's drift towards authoritarianism (Kucharczyk, et al., 2017). We agree with political scientist Pippa Norris who argues that "authoritarianism can best be explained as a cultural backlash in Western societies against long-term, ongoing social change." (Norris, 2016).

The chief driving forces behind Poland's populist upheaval are nativism, political Catholicism and fear of Muslim refugees. Many political commentators ascribe the rise of authoritarian populists to a backlash against open society values.[1] The PiS talks of anger at the political and cultural elites who defend these values and are seen to have enjoyed most of the benefits of Poland's economic transformation (Kucharczyk, 2018).

The political message that led to the triumph of the PiS in the parliamentary elections played on prevailing societal trends, strong anti-elitist emotions and favourable economic circumstances coupled with inflated social expectations. It has since enabled the party to take control of the public media and adopt social policies like the "Family 500+ programme" of child benefits.

After more than two years in government, PiS has held on to its middle-class voters and increased its support among both the unemployed and self-employed, and among the nation's powerful farming community (Pazderski, 2018). Its message is that it plans to build a sense of national self-esteem and regain the position, allegedly "grabbed by the elites during the political transformation".

By playing on these social moods, the PiS has created a strong bond between its electorate and the movement's leader Jarosław Kaczyński (Gdula, 2018).

At the same time, Poland has become a majoritarian democracy. The country's most important checks and balances and rule of law institutions have been dismantled, including the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Council of the Judiciary, common courts and public media. Civic liberties have been curtailed, and the electoral system altered.

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1   See methodology section in Appendix and "Key Insights Report" for a more detailed account of the conceptual and theoretical considerations underlying the *Voices on Values* research.

All this is obviously contrary to concepts of liberal democracy and open society values. But these events also have a broader significance. Social support for the welcoming of migrants has reached its lowest level ever, thanks to PiS propaganda and that of the conservative, anti-elitist Kukiz'15 movement[2]. This is a country that in any case has welcomed very few refugees. In 2017, the total number of officially recognised refugees was 742, and 567 in 2016[3]. At the same time, opposition parties have failed to oppose these populist narratives adequately. The open society has been among the first victims of the new

political setup in Poland. Can it somehow be blamed for the current situation, or did it not have enough time to properly establish itself? Our *Voices on Values* project[4] attempts to answer some of these questions via a public survey and expert interviews.

Both sources of data enabled us to observe societal causes for the success of authoritarian populism. But before we look at the state of Poland's open society today, let us take a few steps back to examine its roots and historical developments.

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2   In the first half of 2015, before the refugee crisis hit Europe, 70 percent of Poles agreed that people fleeing war should be given shelter in Poland. But by 2017, three-quarters (74 percent) opposed the relocation of refugees from the Middle East and Africa (Głowacki, 2017, p. 1), 70 percent were against admitting refugees from Muslim countries (Badora, 2017, pp. 1-4) and 63 percent did not want to admit refugees from countries involved in armed conflicts (Feliksiak, 2017, pp. 1-2).

3   https://migracje.gov.pl/statystyki/

4   http://voicesonvalues.dpart.org/

THE OPEN SOCIETY: AN AMBIGUOUS CONCEPT

THE CONCEPT'S ROOTS IN POLISH MODERN HISTORY

Our in-depth, expert interviews examine the roots of an open society in Poland and how it relates to civil society. Both concepts date back to Solidarność, the mass social movement of the 1980s which is often said to have triggered the events of 1989 and the ensuing political and economic transformation.

In the early 1980s, Solidarność had 10 million members and is remembered by many as an ideal civil movement. Most of our interviewees added nuance to this commonly held perception.

Ireneusz Krzemiński, a sociology professor and social commentator, observes that the first formulation of a 'civil society' was made in relation to Solidarity.

"Solidarity has left a lasting imprint on world history (…) and in the political vocabulary. The opposition and Solidarity were later described as the civil society, and that changed the perspective of Sovietology and the analysis of transformational reality. In the 1970s and until the mid-1980s, civil society had not been a term used by European or American sociologists or political scientists. The Solidarity movement also created a new socio-political category, which also had political consequences because it refers to political principles - to the concept of rights of citizen and man."

Prof. Krzemiński and other people we interviewed stress the uniqueness of the Solidarność experience, which was a period of great openness – in terms of listening to different viewpoints, and the sense of community. According to Małgorzata Fuszara, formerly the Government Plenipotentiary for Equal Treatment, these were "very refreshing" times after years of communism and public distrust and divisions:

"This was very obvious during the strikes of 1980-81. People spoke to each other, they were not afraid. In a totalitarian system, people live in small circles they trust, which is the opposite of open attitudes. But not only did people talk and listen to each other. (…) They talked to each other for the first time, and offered cigarettes that used to be issued for cards[5]. Strangers were demonstrating that they wanted to make contact. After totalitarianism this was evidence of openness…"

Marek Rymsza, a sociologist and adviser to the President of Poland, recalled the unique role of openness and sense of community in the Solidarity movement in 1980-81: *"Solidarity was an open debate that continued non-stop. There were discussions all the time. If you wanted to say something, you could, and others listened to you. (…). Explaining your reasons but accepting that the opposite reasons were valid too."*

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5   In the state-controlled economy of the kind we had in Poland, products were issued in exchange for special coupons - so-called cards, that people received in exchange for their work.

Part of Poland's problem is that these experiences were not translated into social principles. Prof. Ireneusz Krzemiński says:

"Solidarity stays in our memories as a personal, profound experience that had very little impact on collective patterns, or what could be called our institutional memory. It did not build models for political action. (...) Not one of the ruling parties or any other socio-political force built on the model that Solidarity had virtually invented: respect for other people's opinions. And when the opponent becomes the enemy, we see the consequences now..."

Martial law was pronounced in 1981 and put a brutal end to the so-called 'carnival of the first Solidarity'. Poles retreated into their private worlds and a 'sociological vacuum' ensued[6].

Little changed with the creation of the new non-communist state in 1989. Additionally, the first partially free elections of June 4 1989 did not see the same massive participation as in the early days of Solidarity. Marek Rymsza, a sociologist and adviser to the President of Poland, says:

"With Solidarity, the public space suddenly belonged to us citizens. (...) But this collective experience was interrupted by martial law, a side-effect of which was a return to privacy. (...) The Solidarity experience was too short-lived. Solidarity had very communal roots, but ten years later at the Round Table discussions[7] its proposals had become neoliberal in their concern for market mechanisms and political democracy. Ideas of societal self-organisation had been abandoned. (...) On June 4, people gave their mandate but did not participate. Direct participation was ten times lower. There were 1-1.5 million members of Citizens' Committees, the successors to Solidarity, compared with 10 million during the first days of Solidarity."

Two camps emerged in the 1990s – post-Solidarity and post-communist. These new elites limited political pluralism because they occupied a growing part of the public space. The next development in this bipolar political scene was the growing dispute between the central-liberal Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, PO) and the conservative Law and Justice party (PiS). This started around 2003-04 and defines the direction of Polish politics to this day.

According to a left-oriented sociologist, an additional factor was the changing media landscape. Although it was still very pluralistic in the early 1990s, by a decade later the liberal media had come to dominate, resulting in a limited diversity of opinion.

The crisis in the traditional media of 2007-9 saw many mostly right-wing, conservative commentators writing online, as their access to mainstream media was limited. Later, these writers set up their own conservative media close to the PiS. This became 'identity media' aimed only at PiS supporters, and representing only one section of a politically divided society.

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6   Strong identification with primary groups and the Polish nation, with low or no identification at all with intermediate level groups (Nowak, 1979)

7   The Polish Round Table Talks took place in Warsaw from February to April 1989. They were initiated by the government, which invited the opposition organised around the banned Solidarność trade union and other groups in an attempt to defuse growing social unrest. The talks led to radical changes, including the organisation of the first, partially democratic elections of June 4, 1989.

HOW POLISH EXPERTS UNDERSTAND AN OPEN SOCIETY

Most of the interviewees, regardless of their political positions, said that the concept of an open society has Polish roots. According to Włodzimierz Paszyński, an educationist and Vice President of the City of Warsaw:

> **"This idea of a civil society or the open society, which I see as synonymous, emerged in Poland in October 1956, and developed in the 1960s in different ways and with different determinants. (…) Then came March 1968[6], which for my generation was an extremely important date, because we began to understand things differently or simply began to understand them."**

The Solidarność experience had a deep influence not only on Western public opinion, but also on the scientific work of civic movements, according to sociologist and cultural scientist Elżbieta Korolczuk: *"The revival of the global debate on the civil society started in Poland and then moved to the West. It emerged in relation to social movements and the concept of civil resistance, a 'weak resistance', an idea of acting at the level of a 'counter-public culture', as Ewa Majewska defined it."*

Yet Korolczuk also observes that if Poland revived the debate on civil society, it imported its formalised structures from the West, *"a certain vision of the relationship between state and society, how they are connected within the capitalist, neoliberal system. Funds were redirected to a political project called 'civil society', but the idea and certain practices were not foreign to Polish culture or social practice. The same goes for the open society."*

Prof. Ireneusz Krzemiński adds another important observation about Pope John Paul II's promotion of the concept of an open society inspired by individual rights.

"The political message was inspired by the moral values in the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights, including that diversity is strength and enriches society… This message was to become the moral foundation of the Solidarity movement. It was less the result of liberal political thinking than of Christian personalism. In fact, these two philosophical strands were tightly connected. Human rights were extremely important because their basic value is dignity… And according to that no one can decide about individual happiness, and this opens the road to pluralism - there is no one model for happiness. If every man is given the right to happiness, then we must build a diverse society." [Ireneusz Krzemiński]

Pope John Paul II's role in initiating civic society in Poland is stressed by Marek Rymsza, a conservative expert who is an adviser to the President of Poland. He mentioned the papal pilgrimages to Poland, when people came out into the streets in huge numbers. The size of the crowds made them realise they could trust themselves and that they had the power to protest against the state.

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8   The Polish 1968 political crisis, also known as "March 1968", refers to a series of major protests by students and others against the government of the Polish People's Republic. The crisis resulted in the suppression of student strikes by security forces in all major universities across the country and the subsequent repression of the Polish dissident movement. It was also accompanied by mass emigration following an anti-Semitic campaign waged by the minister of internal affairs, General Mieczysław Moczar, with the approval of First Secretary Władysław Gomułka of the Polish communist party.

But Prof. Krzemiński also notes that the current Polish Catholic authorities do not want to follow this path.

Three of the experts interviewed had significantly different perspectives on the open society. An advisor to the President of Poland, Marek Rymsza, prefers the concept of civil society to open society - meaning a community limited to a certain group of people (only citizens, for example). This republican approach usually reflects the views of more conservative citizens. This is important for our analysis, since the notion of openness in a republican community is limited strictly to its members.

Left-wing sociologist Maciej Gdula believes an open society means pluralism ensured by the state, and the promotion of social mobility based on merit. The Polish People's Republic (PRL) guaranteed the last point, he says.

"The idea of an open society has been around since World War Two with its promise of social advancement based on merit, meaning that everyone is entitled to education and to job promotion, even if they've moved from the countryside to the cities. In this sense, real socialism was an open society. At the same time, political pluralism was seen as a threat to an open society - to the society of open possibilities, of social advancement (…)."

Our interviewees all understand the term open society in their own way, although they do agree on some points. For most, irrespective of their political orientation, it resembles or is synonymous with civil society, including liberal concepts about human rights and anti-discrimination. This is what it means to those people who were active during the opposition movement of the 1980s, and the younger generation of experts we interviewed, who reached political maturity in the 1990s.

The idea of rooting an open society in the dignity and individual character of the Solidarity movement is well described by Prof. Ireneusz Krzemiński: *"During the one-and-a-half years of the Solidarity movement, and even after that, this ideal of respect for others, their thoughts and emotions, the notion that each person has the right to say what he or she wants, was such an essential experience that it was passed on."*

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND ATTITUDES TO ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY

Having looked into the origins of an open society in Poland, we can examine how it is faring now. To gain insights into Poles' attitudes towards an open society, in our *Voices on Values* survey, we asked Polish respondents to rate the importance of seven statements reflecting values that the researchers identified as characteristics of open societies, such as the equal treatment of newcomers, freedom of speech and minority rights, as well as of characteristics that tend to appear in closed societies, such as limiting immigration and citizenship rights.[9] For the Polish case study we further grouped the open society characteristics into those that relate more closely to cultural diversity, such as freedom of religion, and those that are linked to the rights of individuals and institutions in a liberal democracy, such as press freedom.

After evaluating the open society attributes in their own right, respondents were presented with trade-off questions in which the open society values are juxtaposed to other concerns people may have, such as political stability, economic security or the protection of cultural traditions. Interestingly, even though Poland is the most ethnically homogenous of the six countries surveyed in the project, with more than 95 percent of the population having Polish origins, respondents had relatively positive views about cultural diversity.

Indeed, when asked if they were willing to trade off open society values for alternative items, respondents generally supported cultural diversity. They considered the equal treatment of newcomers as more important than economic wellbeing, for instance (of the six countries, the Polish were least likely to make this trade-off). In only one situation are Poles a little less committed to the protection of minority rights than Germans, French and Italians: this is when minority rights are contrasted with ensuring that Polish citizens never feel foreign at home.

The situation becomes more complicated when we look at individual items related to cultural diversity. A large majority of respondents say that the equal treatment of newcomers, religious freedom and minority protection are essential for a good society (see figure 1). However, a two-fifths minority also supports a ban on same sex couples kissing in public and wants to restrict citizenship rights only to people with Polish parents.

Moreover, a majority of Poles say that non-Christians should confine their religious practice to their home or places of worship. Curiously, 52 percent of these respondents also declared it essential that everyone be allowed to practise their religion freely.

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9   A full discussion of the conceptual ideas behind the research design and a full list of all attributes can be found in the project's "Key Insights Report".

On the subject of immigration, 60 percent believe it crucial that as few immigrants as possible come to Poland. The most strongly-held value is that everyone in Poland should live by Polish national values and norms – 80 percent of respondents believe this. We should read these results as confirming that Poles are deeply attached to national values, feel extremely proud of being members of their nation (Boguszewski, Głowacki, 2016, p. 2-5) and are rather unfriendly towards immigrants.

FIGURE 1

HOW ESSENTIAL ARE THE FOLLOWING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY?

Open/closed society values related to cultural diversity; closed society values are marked with an asterisk

QA1. Newcomers are treated equally

| 24% | 49% | 19% | 9% |

QA2. Religion can be practiced freely by everyone

| 41% | 38% | 15% | 6 |

QA5. Minority rights are protected

| 37% | 44% | 13% | 6 |

QA8*. As few immigrants as possible arrive

| 27% | 33% | 26% | 14% |

QA10*. Everyone lives by Polish national values

| 39% | 42% | 13% | 6 |

QA11*. Non-Christians don't practice religion publicly

| 21% | 33% | 29% | 17% |

QA12*. Same sex couples don't kiss in public

| 20% | 20% | 33% | 27% |

QA14*: Only Poles have right to Polish citizenship

| 14% | 30% | 35% | 21% |

■ Absolutely essential

■ Rather essential

■ Rather not essential

■ Not at all essential

d|part (2018)

The picture is more nuanced when we look at demographic factors (see Table A1 for open society values and Table A2 for closed society values – both in the Appendix). Women are slightly more supportive of cultural diversity, but the most significant gender differences concern two closed society attributes – that non-Christians should not practise their religion in public, and that same sex couples should not kiss in public.

This reflects a process visible within Polish society in which men are more deeply affected by cultural and socio-economic changes. These changes have seen women gain more important social and professional positions, and more visibility for same-sex relationships. Men who are uncomfortable with these changes protect themselves by taking safe positions related to national belonging, religion and gender identity.

Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, a former social democrat prime minister, adds another explanation of why people feel anxious about the rapidly changing environment:

"The rollercoaster of populism and demagogy in different countries has seen the public debate become less rational. This is related to radical changes in the global economy, with the result that more and more people are having trouble adapting to the new living conditions – especially older, less educated people... And at the same time in the West, in some countries at least, there are people nostalgic about the past, as in Britain. These people don't accept the world as it is, are having emotional difficulties adapting and are extremely vulnerable to populist promises, especially when they suggest a return to the past."

Maciej Gdula, a left-wing sociologist and social commentator, blames an overly individualistic culture for encouraging radical views and closed society attitudes:

"There is frustration among the working and rural classes about a system in which if a person doesn't achieve a comfortable middle-class life they are nothing. This creates frustration that expresses itself in various ways, including by adopting nationalism because they feel it increases their dignity, it makes them feel more attractive at a private level."

Age plays a big role in attitudes to an open society. Polish youth are less interested in cultural diversity than members of the older generations. Other studies have shown that young Poles are the most supportive of national values and the proudest of Polish history (Gyárfášova, Molnár, Krekó, Pazderski, Wessenauer, 2018). They are unenthusiastic about the role played by immigrants. A majority (60 percent) see them as a burden on the social welfare system and a threat to public safety and security (Kucharczyk, Łada, Schöler, 2017, pp. 128-130).

Several of our interviewees mentioned the negative role played by public education and the church. According to Prof. Magdalena Środa, a philosopher, ethicist and social commentator:

"Schools do not teach young people to express themselves, so they passively accept the political situation or are discouraged by it, sometimes amused, sometimes bored. Religious classes… don't add anything to knowledge, moral attitudes or faith. And there is no civic training. It's as if successive governments had realised that civic passivity and politics seen as spectacle are in favour of the ruling class. (…) We have lost a lot by having bad schools and the church has much to answer for in this."

Support for an open society increases with education levels. There is only one exception – the statement "that everyone should live by Polish national values", which is supported mostly by people of medium education levels.

The equal treatment of newcomers and the protection of minority rights are least supported in north-western Poland, which is closest to the western border of the country. This is slightly surprising, considering people in this part of Poland have more of an opportunity to meet Germans or other foreigners. The idea of citizenship based on origin *(jus sanguinis)* is embraced particularly in the south-west regions, which ironically have a relatively large population of national and ethnic minorities. It shows that having direct contact with foreigners or minorities can raise people's doubts about certain attributes of an open society.

Our research shows a significant correlation between recognition of the role of religious values in public life and a lower appreciation of open society values. This correlation also exists in relation to Christian values, such as helping people in need (the equal treatment of newcomers and accepting more immigrants) and tolerance.

One explanation may be related to the Polish construct that believes immigrants are not persons in need. At the same time, the majority of Poles consider assistance to people who need help as an important form of social engagement (Penno Hartlová, Bútorová, Wessenauer, Pazderski, 2018). The relationship between accepting religious values and open society attributes is linear (see Figure 2). So the more people support religious values in politics, the less culturally open they are.

FIGURE 2

Desired role of religious values in public life and evaluation of open society values

RELIGIOUS VALUES SHOULD PLAY A ... ROLE IN POLITICS VS. HOW ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD SOCIETY IS IT THAT...

Answers in percentages

	QA1 Newcomers are treated equally	QA2 Religion can be practised freely by everyone	QA5 Minority rights are protected
Essential	75 76 67 66 57	83 81 80 63 61	85 84 76 65 75
Not essential	25 24 33 34 43	17 19 20 37 39	15 16 24 35 25

Legend: ...no role at all / ...rather minor role / ...rather important role / ...very important role / ...I don't know

d|part (2018)

Most of our interviewees agreed that the Catholic church still has considerable influence in Polish politics, after its support of the opposition under communism and some skilful political manoeuvering after 1989 (Chełstowska, Druciarek, Kucharczyk, Niżyńska, 2013).

Maciej Gdula says: *"The Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) allowed the Church to take a major position in public life when Poland was busy joining the European Union. (...) After 2001, many people were disappointed that the SLD had buried the hatchet with the Church and accepted the status quo. Later still, the main political actors wanted to cohabit comfortably with the Church. As a result, the Church had hegemony over issues related to morality and ethics. (...) The Church effectively blocks any attempts to introduce pluralism into the discussion on ethical issues. This makes the public language on morality, sexuality, abortion totally unambiguous."*

Prof. Magdalena Środa observes: *"The Church is causing the impoverishment of our society. As Prof. Czapiński says in his research, community activities boil down to people going to church, exchanging peace signs. That's the extent of their civil activities. They don't even help their neighbours. Politicians tolerate this because they prefer to invalidate the civil society, and to win the next elections. (...) I have long considered the Church as a strong brake in this country, firstly over the issue of citizenship."*

The same correlation is a bit more complex where closed society attributes are concerned. However, it is still there. Respondents who say that religious values should play a role in public life are generally more willing to say that everyone should live according to Polish norms and values, that same-sex couples should not kiss in public and that only Poles should have a right to Polish citizenship (see figure 3).

This confirms the prevailing conservative character of Poland, in which respecting religious values is in line with nativism, opposition to sexual minorities and support for ethnically exclusive citizenship. This again reflects the political discourse, especially related to the ruling party, as Prof. Ireneusz Krzemiński observes:

"The Church is a reactionary force that is destroying civil society, that destroys openness and helps build the foundations of a party dictatorship. Father Rydzyk and his media conglomerate, with Radio Maryja at the forefront, have created a vivid political ideology expressed in everyday language that is based on connecting Polishness with the Catholic faith. PiS politicians use the same words. The basic inspiration is the ideas of Roman Dmowski[7], his vision of the world as of nations fighting for their own interests, with an added touch of Polish messianism and suffering. This results in this neo-evolutionary point of view. To this was added worship of the nation."

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10   A Polish politician of the late 19th century and the first four decades of the 20th century, a minister of foreign affairs and member of parliament in the interwar years, co-founder of the national movement in Poland and main ideological driver of Polish nationalism.

Desired role of religious values in public life and positive evaluation of closed society values

RELIGIOUS VALUES SHOULD PLAY A ... ROLE IN POLITICAL LIFE VS. IT IS ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD SOCIETY THAT

Answers in percentages

	It's essential that...	It's essential that...	It's essential that...	It's essential that...	It's essential that...
	QA8 As few immigrants as possible arrive	QA10 Everyone lives by Polish national values	QA11 Non-Christians don't practice religion publicly	QA12 Same sex couples don't kiss in public	QA14 Only Poles have right to Polish citizenship

■ ...no role at all   ■ ...rather minor role   ■ ...rather important role   ■ ...very important role   ■ ...I don't know

d|part (2018)

Respondents' attitudes to open/closed society values, as well as their willingness to trade off the attributes of an open society, are also clearly correlated with the major political divisions in Poland, including party preference (see Figures A1 and A2 – both in the Appendix) and political orientation.

Voters for the most important conservative, populist political actors, including PiS, the Kukiz'15 movement and the KORWIN/Wolność party, are less supportive of open society values and more willing to trade them off. This is unsurprising, since all these parties share anti-immigrant, nationalistic and homophobic sentiments.

Voters for the nationalistic National Movement, RN, are the most fervent opponents of an open society,

but there were very few in our research sample so they were not statistically significant for our report. At the opposite end are the supporters of left-wing parties, including the social democratic Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the new left-wing Together (Razem), followed by the centrist-liberals.

Political orientation also translates into a linear correlation between political party preferences and attitudes to open/closed society attributes. People with left-wing views are more in favour of an open society, whereas those with right-wing views are less so (figure 4 and 5). This makes political orientation a good indicator for analysing public life in Poland, especially in relation to socio-cultural issues (Kwiatkowska, Cześnik, Żerkowska-Balas, Stanley, 2016, p. 98).

FIGURE 4

Political self-classification on left-right scale and evaluations of open society values

HOW ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD SOCIETY IS IT THAT...

(1-absolutely essential;... 4 not at all essential; answers presented as mean values)

	Don't know	Left	Centrist	Right
QA1 Newcomers are treated equally	2.41	1.76	2.09	2.27
QA2 Religion can be practised freely by everyone	2.13	1.73	1.76	1.94
QA5 Minorities rights are protected	2.14	1.68	1.78	2.02

Respondents were asked to state where they would position themselves in political terms on a left-right scale from 0 to 10 where '0' means 'the left' and 10 means ' the right'. Respondent answers were then recalculated and categorised into three categories: left, centrist, and right.

d|part (2018)

FIGURE 5

Political self-classification on left-right scale and evaluations of closed society values

HOW ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD SOCIETY IS IT THAT...

(1-absolutely essential;... 4 not at all essential; answers presented as mean values)

d|part (2018)

People who do not agree with government policies and are dissatisfied with the political situation have more open attitudes, and are less supportive of closed society ones.

We can therefore see that Poland is home to a large group of people who are less attached to the culturally-related aspects of an open society. Gender, education levels, world view and political party affiliation inevitably affect these positions.

Worryingly, young Poles are the most hostile to an open society, and the most attached to cultural homogeneity. They are also the keenest to trade off some values linked to cultural diversity for better quality of life (Pazderski, 2018b). This observation confirms other surveys that show Polish youth are less willing than older generations to have a refugee as a colleague, neighbour or family member. Young men in particular are the least likely to want a Muslim, or a gay or transgender person in any of those positions (Winiewski, Hansen, Bilewicz, Soral, Świderska, Bulska, 2017, pp. 75-77, 95).

This does not say much for the quality of Polish education - since after finishing a number of years in school, young people are less open than older citizens, even though they have had more opportunities to meet foreigners. The exposure of young Poles to political and online ideological propaganda may have had an effect. Other research has shown that their most frequent source of information on public issues are Facebook and other online portals, where they believe they receive an objective picture (Gyárfášova, Molnár, Krekó, Pazderski, Wessenauer, 2018, p. 24).

Interestingly, attachment to religious values in the political realm correlates with less support for those open society values associated with cultural diversity. This also means less willingness to help people in need, including refugees. Thecorrelation between attitudes to the same open society values and political orientation is probably equally important.

We can conclude that the challenge of cultural diversity is the driving force behind the political debate in Poland. We will come back to this later.

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS – THE POTENTIAL EFFECT ON AN OPEN SOCIETY

Poles have valued democracy highly ever since socio-political transformation began in 1989. In mid-2018, 76 percent of respondents agreed that "democracy has an advantage over all other forms of government", the highest proportion ever (Feliksiak, 2018, p. 1), even if among 15-24 year-olds only half agreed that "democracy is the best possible political system" (Kucharczyk, Łada, 2017b, pp. 18-20).

In addition, personal attachment to democracy has grown, with only 26 percent of respondents agreeing with the statement: "For people like you it does not matter whether governments are democratic or undemocratic" (Feliksiak, 2018, p. 2).

This prevailing recognition of democracy in Poland runs counter to the fact that the ruling PiS has maintained considerable social support, even after introducing anti-democratic measures.

This surprising fact can be explained in two ways. First, by different understandings of democracy – one refers to the rule of law and the protection of minorities, the other is based on authoritarian values and the persistent view in Poland that democracy is a system in which the will of the majority prevails[11].

Second, the effect of the PiS political discourse, supported by the government-controlled public media, which holds that the ruling party is working to increase democracy in Poland. According to this narrative, parties in the past only worked for their own interests and for the benefit of small elites.

Our survey confirms these observations. It shows that Poles strongly support all open society values related to the functioning of a liberal democracy. All four items related to democratic values were evaluated as essential ("absolutely" or "rather") by some 80 percent of respondents.

Freedom of expression was recognised by 90 percent (see Figure 6), even if at the same time Poles are quite supportive of anti-democratic values. Sixty percent accept that the government should force the media to show Poland only in a positive light, and 70 percent agree with the majority rule concept of democracy.

These results show that the concept of liberal democracy is clearly not fully rooted or deeply understood in Poland.

11   See Gazeta Wyborcza, 19.03.2016.

This has created fertile ground for the latest political developments. Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, a former prime minister and from the social democratic, post-communist party, points to shortcomings that existed at the beginning of Poland's political transformation:

"We, I mean all the governments, made the mistake of neglecting civic education. People need to understand about the state, the budget, foreign policy, the world situation. We did not focus on modernising Polish schools … Why did we not do this? Maybe because we concentrated too much on other issues. We had three million unemployed in 1991, and Polish legislation and the public finance system did not have the institutions or funds to support them. But there was also probably a naive conviction that in a democratic state people would naturally become open, democratic and engaged …"

FIGURE 6

HOW ESSENTIAL ARE THE FOLLOWING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY?

(open/closed society values related to individual and institutional democratic rights; closed society values are marked with an asterisk).

QA3: That everyone can express their opinion freely

| 56% | 33% | 5 | 6 |

QA4: That government-critical groups and individuals can engage in dialogue with the government

| 43% | 41% | 12% | 4 |

QA6: That all political views of the population can be represented in parliament

| 34% | 44% | 17% | 5 |

QA7: That the media can criticise the government

| 42% | 36% | 16% | 6 |

QA9*: That the government ensures media reporting always reflects a positive image of Poland

| 25% | 35% | 26% | 14% |

QA13*: That the views of the government always represent the views of the majority of people in the country

| 27% | 42% | 21% | 10% |

- Absolutely essential
- Rather essential
- Rather not essential
- Not at all essential

d|part (2018)

Some social groups are more unhappy and less tolerant of liberal democracy than others. Although they are reluctant to endorse values related to cultural diversity, men are more supportive than women when it comes to open society values (see table 1). Again, young Poles (aged 18-24 and 25-34) are the least supportive of all age groups. This result chimes with our experts' opinions on Polish education:

Journalist and left-wing activist Agata Diduszko-Zyglewska: *"This is the aftermath of the fallout in our education system after 1989, when we opted for freedom rather than education as a top priority. We didn't focus on culture, although it shapes society... I know from research that people who leave Polish schools do not know about traditional political orientations to the right or left (...), and they don't know how the country works."*

Prof. Ireneusz Krzemiński says: *"We lack social knowledge, social education, and social activities. Young people don't know how to build a community, to solve group problems, to build leadership skills and do things democratically... We still have this model of being at the top and kicking the one below. It's authoritarian behaviour, but without admitting to authoritarian attitudes."*

Włodzimierz Paszyński, Vice President of the City of Warsaw, observes: *"We have to create a different kind of school, but this is not a one-year process. If today we start inventing a new school, it won't be ready for 10-15 years (...) On the contrary, the current so-called educational system has clearly killed the greatest achievements of the school reforms of the late 1990s - the team work, project work, the more self-governing character of schools. And this has happened despite the fact that these tools have been worked on in a hundred ways over the last 20 years..."*

Highly educated people are the most supportive of the open society indicators related to liberal democracy, the less educated the least. And this correlation is linear. When it comes to media freedom, the proportion of supporters with higher education is twice as high as supporters with basic education.

TABLE 1

Crosstabulation: demographic features and evaluations of open society values

HOW ESSENTIAL ARE THE FOLLOWING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY?"

		QA3 Everyone can express their own opinion		QA4 That critical groups/ individuals can engage in dialogue with government		QA6 All political views can be represented in parliament		QA7 That media can criticise the government	
		Essential	**Not essential**	**Essential**	**Not essential**	**Essential**	**Not essential**	**Essential**	**Not essential**
Gender	**Male**	91	9	85	15	80	20	86	14
	Female	87	13	82	18	77	23	72	28
Age	18-24	86	14	72	28	70	30	62	38
	25-34	87	13	78	22	71	29	75	25
	35-44	88	12	84	16	79	21	91	9
	45-54	92	8	84	16	84	16	81	19
	55-64	87	13	87	13	81	19	78	22
	65+	94	6	95	5	83	17	80	20
Level of educational attainment	**Low**	79	21	64	36	64	36	46	54
	Medium	89	11	84	16	79	21	81	19
	High	92	8	89	11	80	20	83	17

The situation is a little more complicated when it comes to closed society values. Women are slightly more supportive of the idea that the government should make the media show a positive image of Poland, and men are more supportive of the concept of a majority-ruled democracy.

Both closed society values are supported by older Poles - 45-54 year-olds, in the case of the government's control over media. The oldest Poles surveyed (65+) supported the majoritarian concept of democracy. The level of these views is to a certain extent correlated with education levels. It should be noted, however, that people with the lowest education levels are the least supportive of both closed society values.

Respondents who believe that religious values should play a very important role in politics are also those for whom open society values are the least essential and closed society values the most important (see figures A3 and A4 – in the Appendix). Support is more balanced when we look at the majoritarian concept of democracy, as there is widespread support in Poland for this construct. As former prime minster Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz puts it:

"Polish people believe that democracy is a system in which the majority decides. Full stop. Not a majority within the law, not a majority under the condition of respecting certain rights, not a majority seeking the widest possible consensus and therefore open to compromise... No. The majority decides."

One might assume that Polish attitudes to open/closed society values in a liberal democracy correlate with political affiliation. Although we observe a connection, it varies according to open society values (see Figure A5 – in the Appendix).

Freedom of expression is the most highly supported value of all. Those who support it the least are those who vote for the anti-establishment, traditionalist KORWIN/Wolność, the centrist-liberal Nowoczesna or the PiS.

The right of government critics to engage in dialogue with the government is supported the least by voters for the conservative, right-wing populist parties – the ruling PiS and, unexpectedly, for both the anti-establishment KORWiN/Wolność party and Kukiz'15 movement.

Voters for the same political actors are the least willing to limit parliamentary representation. The same respondents are also the most willing to give the government the right to stop the media from criticising it, with PiS supporters the least attached to such media freedom.

Interestingly, those who say they would definitely not take part in parliamentary elections or that they are not eligible to vote (so probably the youngest voters) are also the least supportive of all open society values related to liberal democracy.

For those without the right to vote, this may represent a lack of understanding of democratic values. Among those respondents who reject their right to elect representatives, it may relate to their lack of faith in democratic rules.

The situation looks similar for closed society values, which are the most supported by PiS, Kukiz'15 or KORWiN/Wolność voters (see Figure A6 – in the Appendix). In contrast, the government's right to limit media freedom is least supported by respondents who vote for the new left-wing Razem/Together party, the Polish People's Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL) and the liberal Nowoczesna. The least supportive of the majoritarian concept of democracy are voters for the PSL, KORWiN/Wolność, Together/Razem or Civic Platform (PO).

Having noted the correlation between support for political parties and liberal democracy open/closed society views, we should not be surprised to see a clear connection with political orientation.

Again, this relation has a linear character. Self-declared left-wingers are the most supportive of open society values and the least supportive of closed society ones. The only exception is freedom of expression, which is the least supported by people who have centrist political views, although the differences are not significant.

The biggest differences between people of different political orientations are in their attitudes to the right of the media to criticise the government (see figures 7 and 8). This may explain why right-wing, conservative parties are keener to limit media freedom and to support the development of partisan media.

Polarised and online media also play a major part, as the left-wing sociologist Maciej Gdula observes:

"The year 2009, when Axel Springer's 'Dziennik' daily closed, is when the hegemony of the internet and complete freedom began. The public sphere is much more open to radical and right-wing voices as well as others. (...) The conditions for doing politics changed, which explains why the right was winning. This was not only related to a surfeit of liberal society or to any rebellion by the victims in society. The right was for very long time confined to the margins, and so learned how to use social media. It gave them an advantage and is partly responsible for their success. The old elites were more used to traditional information channels."

FIGURE 7
Political self-classification on left-right scale and evaluations of open society values relating to liberal democracy

HOW ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD SOCIETY IS IT THAT...
(1-absolutely essential;... 4 not at all essential; answers presented as mean values)

	QA3 Everyone can express own opinion	QA4 Critical groups/individuals can engage in dialogue with government	QA6 All political views can be represented in parliament	QA7 Media can criticise the government
Don't know	1.95	2.07	2.30	2.22
Left	1.46	1.55	1.81	1.49
Centrist	1.59	1.77	1.82	1.81
Right	1.55	1.81	1.95	1.98

d|part (2018)

FIGURE 8

Political self-classification on left-right scale and evaluations of closed society values relating to liberal democracy

HOW ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD SOCIETY IS IT THAT...

(1-absolutely essential;... 4 not at all essential; answers presented as mean values)

	Don't know	Left	Centrist	Right
QA9 Government ensures media reporting always reflects a positive image of Poland	2.49	2.61	2.21	2.02
QA13 Views of the government always represent the views of the majority of people	2.31	2.23	2.10	2.00

d|part (2018)

The situation is similar for respondents who say they support PiS government policies. Respondents who strongly disapprove of the constitutional reforms are the strongest supporters of liberal democracy's open society values.

They are also the least supportive of the idea that the government should force media to present a positive image of Poland.

The position of respondents who only moderately disapprove of government reforms is more nuanced. On some issues, their opinions are very similar to those of respondents who support government policies.

The situation is clearer in the case of attitudes to majoritarian democracy. Those who are unhappy with the government are less supportive of this idea than supporters of government policies (see figures A7 and A8 – in the Appendix). The correlation is similar to the one with personal satisfaction with the political situation in Poland (see figure 9). Respondents who are more satisfied are the least supportive of open society values, and more supportive of the government's right to control the media.

When we look at support for majoritarian democracy, respondents' opinions are more balanced – those who are satisfied with the system say the role of the government's representation of majority views is less important, whereas those who are not satisfied at all say it is.

Personal satisfaction with the political situation and evaluations of open/closed society values

HOW ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD SOCIETY IS IT THAT...
(1-absolutely essential;... 4 not at all essential; answers presented as mean values)

d|part (2018)

Despite Poles' considerable personal attachment to democracy, liberal democratic values are definitely not fully rooted or deeply understood. In particular, a large group of Poles do not value media freedom and agree with the majoritarian concept of democracy. Again, the youngest, less educated Poles and those who believe that religious values should play an important role in politcs are the least supportive of open society values. This attitude correlates with declared support for particular parties, declared political orientation and satisfaction with the country's political situation. It reflects deep political polarisation within Polish society and explains why the state of Polish democracy is a vital topic of debate. At the same time, because Poles support this state of affairs, almost all the political parties declare their intention of strengthening it.

THE CHINA SYNDROME – DEMOCRACY AS OPPOSED TO ECONOMIC PROSPERITY

The robustness of an open/civic society can be judged by how much its citizens value the rules of their democracy when compared with quality of life. This is especially interesting in a country like Poland that has gone through relatively rapid and deep socio-economic transformations.

Poland's democracy is fragile. It could easily morph into a system that borrows solutions from China or so-called illiberal democracies, where economic development is prized above democratic freedoms. Our data shows that a significant group of Poles (26%) prefers freedom, democracy and freedom of expression to living standards, the price of goods and availability of services – whilst only 19% prefer the latter above the former.

These results are the reverse of those obtained by the Institute of Public Affairs and its partners in four Visegrad countries in August 2017, when large numbers of Poles placed living standards above the quality of their democracy (Penno Hartlová, Bútorová, Wessenauer, Pazderski, 2018, p. 25).

We would need to conduct further surveys to find out if our newer observation represents a steady trend.

Both surveys saw the largest proportion of respondents (48 percent in the *Voices on Values* research) saying that both statements were equally important. This could be seen as positive, since only one fifth of the population places quality of life above democracy.

But, the situation gets more complicated when we look at how the answers are spread across social groups.

More men than women prefer freedom and democracy, while women tend to see both statements as equally important.

Young Poles (aged 18-24 and 25-34) are the only age group that values living standards more than democracy. Fewer people than in other age groups say that both are equally important. This may reflect a stronger polarisation among young people, and their lower awareness that the two values can co-exist.

Moreover, from further research we also know that quite a large group of young Poles (aged 16-29) would sacrifice some democratic principles for better standards of living (40 percent) as well as for security reasons, especially protection from terrorism (55 percent) (Gyárfášova, Molnár, Krekó, Pazderski, Wessenauer, 2018, p. 6).

Education levels do not make a difference to how respondents reply, but those with lower education levels seem to be less aware that both options can co-exist, and many simply don't know what to answer. (See table 2).

TABLE 2

Crosstabulation: demographic features and preference of the quality of democracy vs. living standards
(row percentages)

		WHICH FEATURE IS MORE IMPORTANT TO YOU PERSONALLY IN THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM?		
		Freedom, democracy, the opportunity to express oneself and one's opinion	Living standards, price of goods and availability of services	Both are equally important to me
Gender	**Male**	33	20	44
	Female	20	18	50
Age	18-24	26	25	37
	25-34	27	28	38
	35-44	30	17	46
	45-54	24	15	53
	55-64	21	13	54
	65+	27	14	56
Education level	**Low**	25	18	36
	Medium	24	17	52
	High	29	23	43

Preferences also differ according to political affiliation. The largest numbers of respondents who prefer the quality of democracy to living standards are found among supporters of the PSL, PO and Nowoczesna. Poland's two left wing parties, meanwhile, have the biggest proportion of supporters who deem both equally important. Interestingly, the Kukiz'15 movement has a greater share of supporters prioritizing democracy over living standards than the the two left wing parties. However, it still has a bigger share of supporters who prefer living standards (see figure 10).

FIGURE 10

Attitudes to quality of democracy vs. living standards according to political affiliation

IF NATIONAL ELECTIONS WERE HELD TODAY; WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING PARTIES WOULD YOU VOTE FOR (IF AT ALL)?

POLITICAL PARTY PREFERENCE

PSL*
| 52% | 18% | 30% |

PO
| 36% | 18% | 41% | 5 |

.Nowoczesna
| 32% | 17% | 40% | 11% |

SLD
| 27% | 18% | 55% |

Razem/Together*
| 22% | 5 | 70% | 2 |

Kukiz'15
| 31% | 33% | 31% | 5 |

PiS
| 20% | 20% | 57% | 3 |

KORWiN/Wolność
| 20% | 32% | 43% | 5 |

Would definitely not vote
| 23% | 11% | 28% | 38% |

I'm not eligible to vote in parliamentary elections*
| 10% | 26% | 10% | 54% |

- ■ Freedom, democracy, the opportunity to express oneself and one's opinion
- ■ Living standards, price of goods and availability of services
- ■ Both of them are equally important to me
- ■ It's hard to say

Data for the parties with an asterisk should be treated with caution because of the small number of their supporters in the survey sample.

d|part (2018)

Not surprisingly, considering the situation in Poland, attitudes to both options are correlated with political orientation – respondents on the left and centre want more democratic rules, while those on the right are more concerned with living standards.

The correlation is more diverse when we look at the PiS government's constitutional reforms. Strong supporters of government policy also prefer a better quality of democracy, while moderate supporters value their living standards. The situation is similar with people who disapprove of governmental policies – people who moderately criticise government reforms value higher living standards, while those who strongly disagree with the government support the quality of democracy significantly more (see table A3 – in the Appendix – for more details).

A significant part of society therefore has quite moderate opinions on the government (their views can be changed more easily), and at the same time is more concerned with their wellbeing than with debates about the rule of law and the quality of democracy. Respondents at the two extremes, who either unequivocally support the government or criticise its activities, care more about the situation of democracy. They have different reasons for these opinions, rooted in the narratives of the ruling or opposition parties. As left-wing sociologist Maciej Gdula observes, this is also why the ruling party narrative refers to democratic rules:

"This is very common in the case of PiS supporters... There is an ongoing contest between those who say that PiS is violating democracy and the PiS, which doesn't claim that democracy is bad and insists that 'the fact that we put our people in parliament is the implementation of a democratic mandate'. In this sense the PiS is still part of a democratic fantasy."

Respondents who prioritise living standards above good democracy include those aged 18-34, people who live in south-west and southern Poland, and voters for right-wing conservative political actors (PiS, Kukiz'15 and KORWiN/Wolność) who believe religion should play a political role.

Those who see no role for religion in politics are more supportive of the quality of democracy than

of living standards. But when it comes to those who vote for the ruling PiS, its moderate supporters prefer living standards to the quality of democracy, while its strong supporters value democracy more highly.

An analysis of the correlation between answers to respective questions in our survey shows that these preferences are also connected to open and closed society values, mainly relating to cultural diversity. Respondents who choose the quality of democracy are more supportive of cultural diversity than those who prefer living standards.

The opposite is generally true when it comes to negative values related to cultural diversity, which are less supported by people who prefer the quality of democracy.

However, there are two closed society-related options that even people who prioritise democratic freedoms and rights assess as "rather essential" – these are that everyone should live according to Polish national values (QA10) and that non-Christians should not practise their religion in public (QA11).

This may be another confirmation of the conservative national views that a majority of people in Poland share (see table A4 – in the Appendix), based on Polish tradition and history. As Elżbieta Korolczuk observes:

"The 19th-century martyrdom tradition definitely persists and, as Professor Maria Janion[12] says: 'A nation that cannot exist without suffering has to inflict it upon itself'. This is what is happening in Poland. The state promotes the view of Poland as a nation, which of course involves an ideology, with some practices, and we have a situation where adopted legislation defines the boundaries between strangers and us in such a way that we cannot help strangers, we cannot see them as human ..."

These values explain why many people will trade off open society values related to cultural diversity for better life conditions, and especially if the value to be traded off is about accepting foreigners in Poland.

In a more experimental part of our survey, 51 percent of Poles (57-66 percent in the youngest age groups) say that state policies that improve wellbeing are more important than those ensuring the equal treatment of new arrivals to Poland. Only 18 percent of respondents chose the latter option.

When it comes to liberal democratic values, there is no clear correlation with whether people prefer the quality of democracy or living standards. However, people who chose quality of democracy tend to value the media's freedom to criticise the government and the fact that all political views are represented in parliament.

The situation changes where closed society attributes related to liberal democracy are concerned. Those who prefer the quality of their democracy are the least supportive of the idea that both these items (that government should have the right to force the media to present a positive image of Poland, and that the government should always represent the views of the majority) are essential to a good society.

However, closed society attributes get the most support from people who say that both the quality of democracy and living standards are equally important.

We can conclude that people who prefer higher living standards are less attached to cultural diversity.

Polish respondents are deeply attached to the values of liberal democracy, even when they rate living standards as more important than the quality of their democracy. This explains why most political actors in Poland claim to be democratic, even when their actions are undemocratic. It is also why Poles are willing to tolerate undemocratic activities, and will listen to these same politicians argue against cultural diversity and for the protection of national values and patriotism. The overall effect is to encourage Poles to abandon culturally-oriented, open society values if they are persuaded it is necessary to preserve living standards.

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12   Polish professor, a well-known historian of literature, researcher of Polish culture of the 19th and 20th centuries, affiliated with the Institute of the Literature Research at the Polish Academy of Science.

CONCLUSION

Cultural diversity, more than any other issue, has the power to divide Poles. This manifests itself in political preferences, and in whether people are happy or unhappy with the political situation. Gender, age, education levels and acceptance of the presence of religion in political life also have an impact.

Arguments that play on fears caused by cultural diversity make it easier to convince Poles that it is worth exchanging some of their democratic freedoms for a better quality of life. Without those fears, their attachment to the values of a democratic society would prevail.

Democratic values in Poland have shallow roots, and this gives Polish politicians a ready opportunity to manipulate them. Slogans about reducing cultural diversity and the protection of Polish values are the first stages in a more concerted attack on the values of an open society.

Poles are inconsistent in their support of open society values as they relate to liberal democracy, suggesting that democratic values are not deeply embedded in Poland - and explaining why so many Poles accept a majoritarian model of democracy.

This preference is strongest among respondents who are mildly dissatisfied with the political situation, which makes it easier for politicians to bring them over to their side by using slogans about cultural diversity.

Our *Voices on Values* research also shows the negative influence of the Catholic church in the public sphere. All open society attributes related to cultural diversity and liberal democracy are influenced by the role of the Church in politics.

The more people recognise and support the Church's role in public life, the higher the closed society attitudes. Acceptance of the role of religious values in public life is also in line with a greater willingness to trade off open society values for alternative options.

The most alarming observation we make is that young Poles (aged 18-24 and 25-34) are the least supportive of all the open society values presented to them, and the closest to closed society attitudes. They also have the least open attitudes to cultural diversity, and are the only social group that prefers living standards to more democratic values.

The concept of an open society stands at the centre of Polish political debate, particularly when it comes to cultural diversity. One reason may be a failure to transmit the experiences of tolerance, dialogue and community that were so prevalent during the Solidarity movement.

To address this, better education about democratic principles is needed. In addition, more sensitivity with regards to cultural diversity needs to be encouraged. This could help people resist the superficial appeal of populist politicians.

Moreover, as the experts we interviewed made clear, without brave political leaders who can communicate openly about the challenges Poland faces and formulate a clear, positive narrative about how to meet them, Poland may struggle to hold its own in today's geopolitical and cultural transformations.

Modern societies need to welcome outsiders and to be able to communicate with them. If people in Poland do not acquire these skills, then Poland may lose opportunities to cooperate further and its development may suffer. Encouraging that openness may be one of the most important and urgent tasks that Poland faces.

We suggest the following steps:

- Establishing an effective system of formal and informal civic education in the country. No political force in Poland has taken up this challenge since 1989. Schools need to put more stress on team and project work, and encourage a positive civic attitude, guidance on voting, public participation and volunteering. In addition, schools should be more self-governing and embedded in the community.

- Media illiteracy is one of the biggest failures of the Polish education system. Young Poles get their information on public issues mostly from social media and the internet. As a result, they are vulnerable to manipulation and may be cut off from a diversity of views. Research shows that they have low trust towards traditional media (printed newspapers, radio and TV) and in result stop using them as a sources of information. Thus, new formal and informal education is needed to prepare young people for entering the information market, where different marketing specialists struggle for people's attention.

- Cultural and religious diversity, including anti-discrimination, should be promoted as part of the curriculum.

- Independent and sustainable intermediary bodies - such as civil society organisations – which promote cultural diversity and liberal democracy should be supported. These organisations are currently attacked by state-funded media and deprived of government funds. The European Union should consider supporting these civil society organisations as part of its obligations under Article 2 of the Treaty of the EU.

- State authorities could fund independent and diverse information media. Those in charge of doing so must be politically independent.

- A festival of democracy could be launched to encourage politicians to meet and listen to ordinary citizens – along the lines of similar events in Nordic countries.

- Last but not least, knowledgeable citizens must begin to demand change. Rather than deploying populist slogans, political leaders need to set out the hard but realistic choices available to them, and thereby earn the respect and support of ordinary people.

METHODOLOGY

Original qualitative and quantitative data were collected for this report. A representative survey, using online panels and quota sampling methods was administered for over 1,000 respondents in each project country (1,029 in Poland).

The survey first asked respondents to evaluate seven attributes associated with open societies and seven attributes with closed societies, and how essential for a good society they were. The items were developed with input from researchers in all six partner countries.

Respondents were then asked to conduct 14 trade-off choices. They were presented with two alternative choices for each of the seven open society attributes and asked whether they found the original attribute or the alternative more important, or if both were equally important.

Country-specific questions were included that could be used for further analyses. Based on dimension reduction techniques, we identified two separate

factors (open and closed society attributes) that correlated only weakly. We computed two summary measures that combined the values for each set of the seven items used in our analyses. For full details, see our report *The Hidden Majority: How most Europeans care about open society values* (www.voicesonvalues.dpart.org)

In Poland, in addition to the survey analyses, in May and July 2018 we conducted interviews with politicians, commentators,scholars, civic servants and civic activists. They represented several political orientations.

We asked our interviewees what they saw as the challenges to Poland's open society. We also discussed the survey's findings to identify potential dissonances between their views and those of the public.

We would like to express our gratitude to these experts for their time and insights.

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APPENDIX

TABLE A1.

Demographic features that determine evaluations of open society values (row percentages)

HOW ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD SOCIETY IS IT THAT...?

		QA1 Newcomers are treated equally		QA2 Religion can be practised freely by everyone		QA5 Minority rights are protected	
		Essential	**Not essential**	**Essential**	**Not essential**	**Essential**	**Not essential**
Gender	**Male**	70	30	79	21	80	20
	Female	74	26	79	21	82	18
Age	18-24	57	43	68	32	78	22
	25-34	59	41	70	30	69	32
	35-44	75	25	79	22	83	17
	45-54	85	15	86	14	83	17
	55-64	73	27	83	17	85	15
	65+	86	14	89	11	92	8
Level of educational attainment	**Low**	57	43	64	36	68	32
	Medium	73	27	79	21	81	20
	High	76	24	83	17	8	13

TABLE A2.

Demographic features that determine evaluations of closed society values (row percentages)

HOW ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD SOCIETY IS IT THAT…?

		Q8 As few immigrants as possible arrive		Q10 Everyone should live by Polish national values		Q11 Non-Christians should not practise their religion publicly		Q12 Same sex couples don't kiss on public		Q14 Only Poles have the right to Polish citizenship	
		Essential	Not essential	Essential	Not essential	Essential	Not essential	Essential	Not essential	Essential	Not essential
Gender	**Male**	61	39	80	20	56	44	48	52	45	55
	Female	60	40	81	19	52	48	33	67	43	57
Age	18-24	76	24	78	22	63	37	56	45	52	48
	25-34	74	26	81	19	49	51	42	59	50	50
	35-44	57	43	80	20	45	55	37	63	44	56
	45-54	56	44	86	15	52	48	37	63	44	56
	55-64	63	37	75	25	52	48	39	61	37	63
	65+	38	62	83	17	65	35	34	66	38	62
Level of educational attainment	**Low**	75	25	68	32	57	43	46	54	54	46
	Medium	61	39	83	17	56	44	42	59	46	54
	High	54	46	79	21	48	52	35	66	36	64

TABLE A3.

Crosstabulation: Political self-classification on a left-right scale / Opinion on government reforms and preference for quality of democracy vs. living standards (in percentages)

		WHICH FEATURE IS MORE IMPORTANT TO YOU IN EVALUATING THE CURRENT POLITICAL SYSTEM?			
		Freedom, democracy, the opportunity to express oneself and one's opinion	Living standards, price of goods and availability of services	Both are equally important	Hard to say
Political self-classification	**Don't know**	13	13	42	32
	Left	38	12	47	3
	Central	26	21	50	3
	Right	24	23	49	4
Opinion on PiS government constitutional reforms	**I strongly approve**	29	16	52	3
	I rather approve	22	31	45	2
	I rather disapprove	17	24	52	7
	I strongly disapprove	35	12	49	4
	I don't know/ it's hard to say	18	12	41	29

TABLE A4.

Crosstabulation: evaluations of open/closed society values related to cultural diversity and preference for quality of democracy vs. living standards

HOW ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD SOCIETY IS IS THAT...

QA1	Newcomers are treated equally
QA2	Religion can be practised freely by everyone
QA5	Rights of minorities are protected
QA8*	As few immigrants as possible arrive
QA10*	Everyone lives by Polish national values
QA11*	Non-Christians don't practise their religion publicly
QA12*	Same sex couples don't kiss in public
QA14*	Only Poles have the right to PL citizenship

Which feature is more important to you in evaluating the current political system	QA1		QA2		QA5		QA8*		QA10*		QA11*		QA12*		QA14*	
	Essential	Not essential	Essential	Not essential	Essential	Not essential	Essential	Not essential	Essential	Not essential	Essential	Not essential	Essential	Not essential	Essential	Not essential
Freedom, democracy, the opportunity to express oneself and one's opinion	73	27	79	21	81	19	49	51	77	23	55	45	40	60	34	66
Living standards, price of goods and availability of services	66	34	75	25	72	28	72	28	81	19	55	45	43	57	51	49
Both of them are equally important to me	78	22	84	16	87	13	62	38	84	16	55	45	40	60	46	54
It's hard to say	52	48	66	34	72	28	58	42	70	30	39	61	32	68	44	56

FIGURES A1 AND A2

Political party preferences in relation to evaluations of open/closed society values

HOW ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD SOCIETY IS IT THAT...

(1-absolutely essential;... 4 not at all essential; answers presented as mean values; data for the parties with names followed by an asterisk should be treated with caution because of the small number of their supporters in the survey sample)


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FIGURE A3

Open society values related to liberal democracy and the role of religious values in public life

RELIGIOUS VALUES SHOULD PLAY IN POLITICAL LIFE... VS. HOW IMPORTANT IS IT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY THAT... (QA 3, 4, 6, 7)

Answers in percentages

d|part (2018)

Evaluations of closed society values related to liberal democracy in relation to desired role of religious values in public life

RELIGIOUS VALUES SHOULD PLAY A ... ROLE IN POLITICAL LIFE VS. HOW ESSENTIAL IS IT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY THAT... (QA 3, 4, 6, 7)

Answers in percentages

Essential	Not essential

QA9
Government ensures media reporting always reflects a positive image of Poland

QA9
Views of the government always represent the views of the majority of people

■ ...no role at all   ■ ...rather minor role   ■ ...rather important role   ■ ...very important role   ■ ...I don't know

d|part (2018)

FIGURE A5

Political party preferences in relation to attitudes towards open society values in a liberal democracy

HOW ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD SOCIETY IS IT THAT...

(1-absolutely essential;... 4 not at all essential; answers presented as mean values; data for the parties with names followed by an asterisk should be treated with caution because of the small number of their supporters in the survey sample)


■ PiS	■ Kukiz'15	■ KORWiN*	■ PSL*	■ PO	■ .Nowoczesna	■ SLD	■ Partia Razem
■ Would definitely not vote		■ I'm not eligible to vote					

d|part (2018)

FIGURE A6

Political party preference in relation to evaluations of closed society values related to liberal democracy

HOW ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD SOCIETY IS IT THAT...

(1-absolutely essential;... 4 not at all essential; answers presented as mean values; data for the parties with names followed by an asterisk should be treated with caution because of the small number of their supporters in the survey sample)


QA9
Government ensures media reporting
always reflects a positive image of Poland

QA13
Views of the government always represent
the views of the majority of people

PiS   Kukiz'15   KORWiN*   PSL*   PO   .Nowoczesna   SLD   Partia Razem

Would definitely not vote   I'm not eligible to vote

d|part (2018)

FIGURES A7 AND A8

Evaluations of open / closed society values related to liberal democracy in relation to attitudes towards government reforms

HOW ESSENTIAL FOR A GOOD SOCIETY IS IT THAT... VS OPINION ON PiS GOVERNMENT REFORMS

(1-absolutely essential;... 4 not at all essential; answers presented as mean values)

d|part (2018)

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