

VOICES ON VALUES REPORT | February 2019

COMMITTED TO RIGHTS, BUT LONGING FOR STABILITY

HUNGARIANS' ATTITUDES TO AN OPEN SOCIETY

OPEN SOCIETY
EUROPEAN POLICY
INSTITUTE



Authors:

Bulcsú Hunyadi
Csaba Molnár
Veszna Wessenauer

**OPEN SOCIETY
EUROPEAN POLICY
INSTITUTE**



This study forms part of *Voices on Values: How European publics and policy actors value an open society*, a joint project by the Open Society European Policy Institute and d|part. The project was launched in September 2017 in Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Poland and Hungary. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors.

**OPEN SOCIETY
FOUNDATIONS**

© 2019 Open Society Foundations



This publication is available as a PDF on the Open Society Foundations website under a Creative Commons license that allows copying and distributing the publication, only in its entirety, as long as it is attributed to the Open Society Foundations and used for noncommercial educational or public policy purposes. Photographs may not be used separately from the publication.

opensocietyfoundations.org

CONTENTS

2	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
3	INTRODUCTION
5	PERCEPTION OF AN OPEN SOCIETY: COMMITTED TO RIGHTS – IN THEORY
9	COMMITTED TO RIGHTS – IN PRACTICE
9	Rights that really matter: political representation and freedom of opinion
11	Inconsistencies in attitudes to a free press
14	Limitations in commitment to rights: Majoritarian democracy and the desire for political, economic and social stability
18	VULNERABILITY TO POPULIST ARGUMENTS
20	ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION AND ETHNIC HOMOGENEITY
22	PATRIOTISM AND ETHNIC XENOPHOBIA
22	Patriotism
24	Ethnic xenophobia
25	Connection between patriotic and ethnic xenophobic attitudes
27	RECOMMENDATIONS
27	Framing and narratives
28	Policy measures
28	Going local
29	CONCLUSION
30	METHODOLOGY
32	APPENDIX I
40	APPENDIX II
41	BIBLIOGRAPHY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Hungarians yearn for political, economic and social stability. They also value cultural homogeneity, and so tend to be hostile to refugees and migrants. Based on original survey data and in-depth interviews, in our report we reveal the complexities of a nation rent by fears, contradictions and the legacy of the past.

The harsh anti-immigration stance the Hungarian government has adopted since 2015 goes a long way to explaining the population's overwhelming hostility to refugees and migrants. But the government's emphasis on ethnicity is not reflected in the survey responses of many Hungarians. Attitudes and positions are more subtle and complex than is generally thought.

Although committed to defending political, religious and minority rights, Hungarians strongly believe in majority rule, tight controls on migration and the respect of national values and norms. We found that even those who feel a strong emotional bond with the nation are divided in their attitude towards "foreigners".

There are those whose patriotism is inextricably linked to xenophobia (we call them "closed patriots") and those who reject xenophobia ("open patriots"). These two groups make up one fifth of respondents, and have fundamentally different attitudes to migration and on the values of an open society¹.

We also asked respondents if they would trade off the values of an open society for other concerns, relating, for example, to economic security or the protection of cultural traditions. Most would not swap political representation or freedom of opinion, whereas religious freedom and minority protection were willingly traded away for a variety of other concerns. These include the protection of cultural traditions and norms, the safeguarding of majority interests, measures needed to ensure that citizens do not feel like foreigners in their own country, and the ambition that everyone in Hungary should share the same cultural values.

People's responses were sometimes inconsistent, revealing that they have a contradictory understanding of some practical aspects of an open society. Most felt, for example, that the media should be able to criticise the government, but also that the government should ensure positive reporting about Hungary.

The main reason why a significant proportion of Hungarians are willing to exchange some rights for other concerns appears to be their overwhelming desire for stability. Economic wellbeing is a major preoccupation. Most deemed political rights less important than economic and political stability.

1 To conceptualise an open society for the purpose of this research, we draw on both Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union as well as on the works of Karl Popper and Western philosophical tradition. For more details please refer to the "Key Insights Report", which will be published in February 2019 and made available at <http://voicesonvalues.dpart.org>.

INTRODUCTION

Democracy and pluralism have been under attack in Hungary since 2010, when the government began to weaken democratic checks and balances and to seriously violate the rule of law and civil liberties (Zgut, 2018).

Democratic institutions have been subordinated to the will of the governing Fidesz party. The free press has been severely handicapped; civil society organisations are being curtailed by political, legal, administrative and financial measures; judges, academics and artists are increasingly under political pressure.

Public opposition to these developments has so far been ineffectual. At the same time, voter support for anti-democratic measures has increased – in April 2018, Fidesz won a two-thirds majority in parliamentary elections, taking 49 percent of the votes cast.

The deterioration of media freedom is crucial to the outlook for democracy in Hungary. As in other areas of governance, the media is under increasingly autocratic control. Most media outlets are controlled directly or indirectly by Fidesz, or by oligarchs with close ties to the government (Szicherle & Wessenauer, 2017).

As a result, independent journalism has declined significantly. The government has discredited independent media outlets by portraying them as political players with party-political agendas.

Fidesz's control of most of the media means there is little space for critical thought. The voices that get heard are mainly loyal to the government, which disseminates disinformation, populist propaganda and political polarisation on a vast scale through centrally organised media outlets, including state media channels.

One of the government's most persistent propaganda messages concerns migration and refugees (Messing & Bernáth, 2015). It has used the issue of refugees to extend its political dominance and to tighten social control via a campaign based on fear. By amplifying ethno-nationalistic feelings, it aims to secure its own political position.

Fidesz has been dividing the political arena into "pro-national" and "anti-national" groups; anyone questioning the government is automatically considered an "anti-national" or a "foreign agent" (Attila Juhász, Csaba Molnár, & Edit Zgut, 2017). This has led to a "us vs. them" narrative in which promoters of an open society and democracy are "them". Migration has polarised societies all over Europe, but the Hungarian government has deliberately induced this process in Hungary - for instance during the 2016 referendum campaign about the EU's migrant relocation plans.

All these developments, together with the political environment, affect how people perceive open society values such as the rule of law, protection of the institutions that ensure citizens' rights, and open debates. The history of Hungarian democracy is another factor: the way communism fell in 1989 has played a crucial role in how Hungarians perceive democracy and fundamental rights. As the democratic transition took place peacefully, few Hungarians fought for their rights then, and do not have the experience to do so now.

After 1989, the new political system guaranteed democratic principles - yet the system itself was always vulnerable. Hungarian society was not guaranteed economic security, although that (or at least the illusion of it) was something they had had under socialism.

Despite initial enthusiasm for democracy, social security soon became Hungarians' main preoccupation. The prospect of joining the European Union brought hope of getting closer to Western living standards, but once Hungary had joined the EU disappointment and frustration replaced enthusiasm and hope. The EU nevertheless remains popular.

The economic crisis since 2008, the political collapse of the left and the rise of the far right have all contributed to the weakening of democratic values in Hungary. After 2010, the government began to openly apply anti-democratic measures and focus on exploiting fears about social security. The symbolic value of democracy was gone, and in the absence of a clear societal vision, extreme political polarisation and populist messages found fertile ground.

Other societal patterns affect the ways Hungarians perceive an open society. Hungary's autocratic past and lack of self-organisation are still very much alive in its acceptance of paternalist attitudes, a subordinate mindset, a lack of interpersonal and institutional trust, and a singularly low level of civic activism.

These characteristics make Hungarian society vulnerable to political polarisation, which is achieved through the blocking of dialogue and openness. Our report examines how these political trends and social patterns influence the perception of what is a "good society" in Hungary.

BRIEF NOTE ON METHODOLOGY

This report's findings are based on a representative online survey and 11 elite interviews. The survey, carried out between February 12 and March 5, 2018, was administered using online panels and quota-sampling methods and conducted among over 6,000 respondents across Europe, of which 1,008 were from Hungary.

Aiming at shedding light on how respondents value an open society, the survey first asked them to rate the importance of seven statements reflecting values that the researchers identified as characteristics of open societies, such as the equal treatment of newcomers, freedom of speech and minority rights². Respondents were subsequently asked to do the same for seven characteristics that tend to appear in closed societies, such as limiting immigration and citizenship rights. After analysing how people evaluated the different characteristics associated with open and closed societies in their own right, we tested how robust people's evaluations of the former were when juxtaposed with other concerns, such as economic security, political stability and the protection of cultural traditions. Additionally, general and country-specific correlate questions were asked that could be used for further analyses.

We applied both quotas and weights to ensure a good representation. Nevertheless, in the Hungarian sample the oldest age groups are slightly under-represented, while higher education levels are a little over-represented. As a result, slight biases in level estimates must be taken into consideration.

The interviews were aimed at exploring attitudes among policy actors and civil society and were conducted with six academic researchers, two politicians, two civic activists and a sociologist from the business sector. The interviewees preferred to remain anonymous and will therefore in the following only be referred to by using their occupation.

We asked interviewees for their views on Hungarian attitudes towards an open society. Then we showed the survey results to them to discuss any dissonances between their expectations and the actual results.

For more detailed information on the survey design and data analysis see the Methodology section.

2 See footnote 1 on the concept of an open society for the purpose of this research.

PERCEPTION OF AN OPEN SOCIETY: COMMITTED TO RIGHTS – IN THEORY

As mentioned above, to gather data on how they value an open society, in the first part of the survey respondents were presented with seven attributes associated with an open society and seven that are usually associated with closed societies, which will hereafter be referred to as “open society attributes” and “closed society attributes” (for full list see Figure 1 below)³. Respondents were asked how important they considered the respective attributes for a “good society”⁴. Their answers tell us a lot about which values Hungarians consider most and least important.

With regards to the open society attributes, the vast majority of Hungarian respondents considered fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression and freedom of the press, as essential for a good society and generally (although not systematically) ranked closed society attributes lower (see Figure 1).

All open society attributes were supported by over half the respondents; the free practice of religion by non-Christians was supported by exactly half. At the same time, even the lowest ranked closed society attributes, namely “that the government ensures media reporting always reflects a positive image of Hungary” and the restriction of religious practice of non-Christians, were considered “absolutely” or “rather essential” by at least half the respondents.

The open society values Hungarians supported the most were political rights (by supported we mean that they ranked the value as “absolutely” or “fairly” essential). Figure 1 shows the incontestable importance of free speech and free media. Freedom of expression came top of the list⁵, considered absolutely or rather essential by 94 percent of respondents. This was followed by the right of government-critical groups and individuals to engage in dialogue with the government, supported by 90 percent; then press freedom, which 86 percent supported. Parliamentary representation of all political views was ranked lowest, supported by 84 percent.

3 For more information on how the survey items were developed and the overall survey design, please see the Methodology section.

4 The term “good society” was chosen as it reflects what respondents consider positive and valuable and, therefore, when linked to ratings can help shed light on the values respondents deem most important.

5 The order of the open and closed society elements is calculated on the basis of the mean value of the answers to the respective statements. A larger number of more “essential” answers does not necessarily mean better positions in the ranking.

Religious and minority rights came next. The right to practise one's religion was ranked fourth with 85 percent support, while the protection of minority rights came sixth with 82 percent support. Equal treatment of newcomers was supported by 64 percent, which is surprisingly high considering the levels of xenophobia and objection to refugees and migrants in Hungary.⁶

Among closed society views supporting ethnicity, majority rule and authoritarian systems, 90 percent agreed that government should always represent the views of the majority, and 78 percent thought that

as few immigrants as possible should be allowed into Hungary. Eighty-one percent felt that everyone should follow Hungary's national values and norms.

Next came restrictive statements related to minority rights, lagging significantly behind: 57 percent wanted to restrict the behaviour of same-sex couples, while half felt that religious practice by non-Christians ought to be restricted. Fifty-one percent supported the idea that the government should ensure that media reporting always reflects a positive image of Hungary.


6 According to the Hungarian pollster institute Tárki, the rate of xenophobes, i.e., those who would allow no refugees to enter Hungary, was 60% in November 2017, compared to 39% in 2014 (Attila Juhász, Csaba Molnár, & Edit Zgut, 2017).

FIGURE 1

Evaluation of importance of open and closed society attributes – closed society attributes are marked with an asterisk

HOW ESSENTIAL ARE THE FOLLOWING FOR A GOOD SOCIETY IN YOUR OPINION?

Answers in percentages



d|part (2018)

There are positive correlations⁷ between all open society attributes, but levels vary. The correlation patterns allow us to identify two groups of open society values. The first relates to political rights: freedom of expression, the right for groups critical of the government to engage in dialogue with it, that all political views should be represented in parliament, and that the media should be allowed to criticise the government.

The second group relates to minority and religious rights: equal treatment of recent newcomers, religious freedom, and protection of minorities. People generally evaluated all the attributes in one group similarly, meaning that a respondent who rated, for example, one of the attributes relating to minority and religious rights highly is likely to have rated others from the same group highly and vice versa. There was also a positive correlation between the attributes in both groups, but not as strong as within (for the complete tables of correlations see the Appendix I, tables 1.1-1.3).

Interestingly, two closed society views correlated positively with most of the open society views. The first was the statement that government should always represent the views of the majority, which is also the most highly rated closed society attribute, ranking third overall. The second closed society attribute that is also correlated with open society views is the idea that everyone should live by the national values and norms of Hungary, which is the third highest rated closed society item and ranks eighth overall.⁸

The correlations show that Hungarian respondents value these two statements positively – as we shall later explain. These were not the only inconsistencies⁹ in the opinion poll's responses.

It should be noted that most of those aged 18 to 24 rated many of the 14 statements as “less essential” for a good society than the older generations. For example, they were the least supportive of banning the public practice of non-Christian religions, but they were also least supportive of the statement that everyone should be allowed to practise their religion freely¹⁰.

A similar pattern emerged with gender. Female respondents emphasised positive and negative statements slightly more than men did. Education levels also affected support for open and closed society views. Those with university degrees emphasised open society views, while those having only primary school education were the least likely to support open attributes. However, those with secondary education were the strongest supporters of closed society statements, although other surveys do not come to the same conclusion.

Results varied significantly with party political preferences. Supporters of the governing Fidesz party were the least likely to support open society views, and the most likely to hold closed views. The same went for Jobbik supporters. Voters for centre-left parties generally emphasised open society views over closed attributes views (see Appendix I, table 2 for the complete tables of open and closed society scores).

The overall results are in line with societal trends. As one of our interviewees, a sociologist specialising in sociopolitics in Hungary, said: *“Hungarians care less about individual rights and more about communal values. Those can be easily addressed by political narratives, unlike individual values and rights.”* He added, *“Hungarians and Central Europeans in general are more traditional, mistrustful, lacking in solidarity, inward-looking and paternalistic than other Europeans.”*

7 A positive correlation means that respondents provided very similar answers to these questions.

8 The latter statement does not correlate with the open society element about the equal treatment of those who have recently come to live in Hungary.

9 By inconsistencies, we mean evaluations that did not correspond to the classic distinction between open and closed society views. While usually assumed to be opposites, for many people they were not antagonistic at all.

10 For more details see (Csaba Molnár & Veszna Wessenauer, 2018).

COMMITTED TO RIGHTS – IN PRACTICE

In the second part of the survey respondents were presented with trade-offs¹¹ in which the open society attributes from the first survey section are contrasted with other concerns, for example relating to political stability, economic security or the protection of cultural traditions. Respondents were asked which one (in their opinion) is more important for a good society or whether both are equally important. Respondents' trade-off choices give us a more detailed picture of the values and issues that matter most to Hungarians and the underpinning reasons.

Even though most Hungarian respondents consider many open society attributes as essential for a good society, their commitment is fragile. Out of the 14 trade-off cases, respondents on average traded off open society attributes for other concerns on four occasions, while on average they chose to prioritise open society attributes only twice. On average, in two more cases, respondents were divided between the open society value and the “equally important” answer option.¹²

RIGHTS THAT REALLY MATTER: POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND FREEDOM OF OPINION

When looking at respondents' trade-off choices, we find that respondents are particularly attached to political rights and are often not willing to trade these in for other concerns. Thirty-nine percent of respondents, for example, favoured parliamentary representation of all parties over a stable majority within parliament. A still significant 31 percent thought the opposite, and 29 percent considered them equally important.

Almost half the respondents were willing to trade off parliamentary representation for another concern - that all parties in parliament adhere to democratic principles - but both views are arguably on the side of the open society.

11 For more details on how the trade-offs were designed please refer to the “Methodology” section.


12 Respondents were divided between the different options in five cases. Among these were two cases in which responses were spread equally between the open society attribute, its alternative and the option that both were equally important. In two cases, respondents were divided between the open society attribute and the option that both the open society view and its alternative were equally important. In one case, respondents were divided between the alternative view and the option that both the open society view and its alternative were equally important.

FIGURE 2

Trade-off between the open society attribute "That all political views can be represented in parliament" and two other concerns

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY OR ARE BOTH EQUALLY IMPORTANT?

(Answers in percentages)



d|part (2018)

Most respondents rated freedom of opinion highly - indeed it was the highest ranked of all attributes (see Figure 1). The support for freedom of opinion also appears to be robust when contrasted with other concerns (see Figure 3). Indeed, respondents prioritised freedom of opinion over the two alternative concerns - that Christian values are not offended and that ethnic and national minorities are not offended - when they did not consider it to be equally important¹³.

It must be noted, however, that both concerns relate to issues that Hungarians do not feel particularly strongly about: the protection of minority rights is the second lowest ranked open society attribute (see Figure 1 above), and most Hungarians are not religious, so the Christian faith does not play a significant role in their actual lives, even though it has a symbolic value in the public discourse, mainly intertwined with traditional values.¹⁴

13 There are slight differences between the answers to the two trade-off questions. In one case those who considered the open society item as more important were in a relative majority, but in the second case they are only the second largest group. However, the difference in proportion between those who considered both elements as being equally important and those who stuck with the open society item was close to the margin of error. So we categorised both cases in the same way - as cases where respondents were divided between the open society item and the opinion that both options were equally important (see Footnote 12).


14 According to the results of the 8th round of the European Social Survey, 30% of Hungarians can be considered religious, 55% not religious and 15% in the middle. The calculation is based on the question "How religious are you?", to which respondents had to reply on a 0-10 scale, where 0 was not at all and 10 was very religious. We considered that people were religious if they placed themselves between 6 and 10, and not religious if they gave a score between 0 and 4. According to the same survey, 16% attended religious services at least once a month or more often, while 83% only on holy days or less often. (Data analysed by the online analysis tool of the European Social Survey: <http://nesstar.ess.nsd.uib.no/webview/>). The Hungarian pollster Tárki describes Hungarian society as having weak religious, national, ethical and moral ties. However, according to their 2013 survey, 65% said that religion was important in their personal life, while 35% said it was not (Keller, 2013).

FIGURE 3

Trade-off between the open society attribute “That everyone can express their opinion freely” and two other concerns

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY OR ARE BOTH EQUALLY IMPORTANT?

(Answers in percentages)



d|part (2018)

INCONSISTENCIES IN ATTITUDES TO A FREE PRESS

A significant proportion of respondents appeared to have a contradictory understanding of the principle of free media and its possible limitations. The item concerning freedom of the press - that the media can criticise the government - was the fourth highest ranked attribute, supported by 86 percent of respondents. At the same time, 51 percent considered it important that the media always “reflects a positive image of Hungary”, de facto implying a restriction of press freedom (see Figure 1 above).

Twenty percent of those who considered government-critical media as “absolutely essential” for a good society also regarded positive media reporting (on Hungary) as absolutely essential. Contrary to our expectations, we found no negative correlation, and thus no inverted relationship, between these two views, even though they might be considered antagonistic (see Appendix I, table 3 for crosstabulation).

Unsurprisingly, Fidesz voters were the strongest supporters of the idea that the government should ensure positive media reporting (see Appendix I, table 4 for results within all other party preference groups). Those who found this essential were also more likely to be patriotic and xenophobic; they tended to think that Hungarians form one large family to which they belonged, and that non-Hungarians should leave the country (see Appendix I, tables 5-6 for crosstabulations).


And yet government-critical media was more important for the majority than the government having a free hand to implement its policies decisively - as shown in Figure 4 below. However, when free media was confronted with the alternative that government decision-making should mostly be guided by experts, a relative majority of 44 percent was ready to trade off free media.

FIGURE 4

Trade-off between the open society attribute "That the media can criticise the government" and two other concerns

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY OR ARE BOTH EQUALLY IMPORTANT?

(Answers in percentages)



d|part (2018)

We came to a similar result when we compared how respondents rated the closed society argument that the government should ensure that media reporting always reflects a positive image of Hungary with the open society view that everyone can express their opinion freely. Again, contrary to our expectations, the two items did not correlate negatively. Those who consider positive media reporting as either “absolutely essential” or “not at all essential” think the same way about freedom of expression.¹⁵ This shows that for the majority of respondents, a media controlled by government is not a violation of freedom of expression (see Appendix I, table 7 for crosstabulation).

These findings completely contradict expectations. The relative majority of those who favour positive media reporting also prefer the idea that the media should be allowed to criticise the government rather than give it free rein to implement its policies. However - and less surprisingly - the more highly respondents rated the importance of positive media reporting on Hungary, the less likely they were to be committed to the idea of a government-critical press.¹⁶

LIMITATIONS IN COMMITMENT TO RIGHTS: CULTURAL HOMOGENEITY AND STABILITY

Eighty-one percent of Hungarian respondents believe that everyone should live by the national values and norms of Hungary, even though this statement implies serious limitations on citizens’ rights.

Although 85 percent of respondents consider freedom of religion essential for a good society, a considerable proportion of respondents are

15 78% of those who considered it absolutely essential that the government ensures that media reporting always reflects a positive image of Hungary found it also absolutely essential that everyone can express their opinion freely. At the same time, 79% of those who considered as not at all essential that the government ensures that media reporting always reflects a positive image of Hungary found it absolutely essential that everyone can express their opinion freely.

16 43 percent of those who considered it absolutely essential that the government ensures that media reporting always reflects a positive image of Hungary also thought that the media being able to criticise the government was barely more important than the government having a free hand in implementing its policies decisively, compared to 29 percent thinking the opposite. At the same time, 47 percent of those who considered the statement about positive media reporting as “rather essential” thought that it was clearly or barely more important that the media can criticise the government than the government has a free hand in implementing policies, compared to 22 percent who thought the opposite.

inconsistent in their answers. Indeed, for many, restricting the religious rights of non-Christians does not mean curtailing religious freedom. Interestingly, despite these two statements being antagonistic, there was also no negative correlation between them.

Furthermore, a relative majority of 46 percent are ready to trade off religious freedom for the protection of Hungary's cultural traditions and values. Respondents are evenly split over whether freedom of religion is more important than the view that all people should share the same cultural values. A possible explanation for this is that protecting and preserving traditions and values sounds appealing, while forcing the same cultural values on every citizen seems less so.

Additionally, the more someone agrees to forbidding the public practice of non-Christian religions, the more likely he or she is to exchange religious freedom for another concern. While these respondents theoretically considered freedom of religion as essential, in practice they were ready to trade off this basic right for an alternative.

We found further limitations in respondents' commitment to open society values with regards to the attributes associated with minority issues. Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a strong positive correlation between the open society view that people who have recently come to Hungary should be treated equally and that the rights of minorities be protected. In other words, those who considered one of the items as being essential for a good society typically regarded the other item as essential too.


However, there are clear boundaries in the minds of many Hungarians about the protection of minority rights, especially if this clashes with the interests of the majority and the concept of cultural homogeneity. As Figure 6 shows, the majority of respondents thought that safeguarding majority interests and ensuring that citizens never feel foreign in their country are more important than the rights of minorities.

FIGURE 5

Trade-off between the open society attribute "That everyone can practise their religion freely" and two other concerns

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY OR ARE BOTH EQUALLY IMPORTANT?

(Answers in percentages)




d|part (2018)

FIGURE 6

Trade-off between open society attribute “That the rights of minorities are protected” and two other concerns

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY OR ARE BOTH EQUALLY IMPORTANT?

(Answers in percentages)



d|part (2018)

Second, if minority rights concern the LGBTQ community, people are less willing to put them into practice. Those who considered it essential to ban

same sex couples from kissing in public had similar views about the protection of minority rights as respondents of the whole sample. This either implies that LGBTQ people are not considered a minority, or that the objection to them is so strong as to not want them included with other minorities.

The results prove that a significant proportion of Hungarians will trade off basic rights like religious freedom or the protection of minorities for attributes related to cultural homogeneity and stability. We cannot exclude the possibility that these anti-minority views are related to specific, less popular minority groups mentioned in the questions.

LIMITATIONS IN COMMITMENT TO RIGHTS: MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY AND THE DESIRE FOR POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL STABILITY

As already shown, political representation, freedom of opinion and a critical press are highly valued by the vast majority of Hungarians – both in theory and in practice. This seems also to be true when we look at political pluralism. A vast majority of 90 percent considers it essential for a good society that government-critical groups and individuals are able to engage in dialogue with the government. This was the second-highest ranked attribute of all.

Yet evaluations of the importance of another attribute appear to contradict this commitment to pluralism. In fact, the same proportion of 90 percent of respondents also regard it as essential that the views of the government always represent the views of the majority. This is the third highest ranked attribute, and, in terms of percentages, is only slightly behind the first. Although it implies limitations on citizens' rights, most Hungarians seem to view a majoritarian-oriented government positively.

Interestingly, when asked whether the existence of democracy and political rights or economic circumstances were more important in a political system, the majority could not commit themselves either way – in theory, both had the same value (see Figure 7). Sixty-three percent said that freedom, democracy and the opportunity to express their opinions were as important as living standards, the price of goods and availability of services.

FIGURE 7

“What is more important? Freedom, democracy, the opportunity to express themselves and their opinion or living standards, the price of goods and availability of services?”

Freedom, democracy, the opportunity to express oneself and one's opinion

14%

Living standards, price of goods and availability of services

16%

Both of them are equally important to me

63%

d|part (2018)

In many of the trade-off situations, however, respondents chose economic security – and to a lesser extent, political security and stability – over rights and pluralistic views. When economic wellbeing was confronted with the pluralist argument, the majority of respondents were divided between the priority of economic wellbeing and the option that both were important. When the pluralistic argument was opposed to political stability, respondents were split almost equally between the three options.

One of our interviewees, a political scientist who specialises in political philosophy, highlighted: *“The most important condition [for having an open society] is to achieve almost equal political and moral status among members of society. This would be difficult to achieve in Hungary because of the sharp economic differences that determine social status and hinder the creation of real political communities. Most societies have formal, legal equality, but real sociological equality is rarely achieved. In Hungary, citizens do not have the same resources to solve their problems. Many choose private school and private healthcare rather than public schools and hospitals.”*

Those respondents who thought that economic circumstances were more important than political rights (Figure 7 above) were more likely to trade off the right of government-critical groups to engage in dialogue with the government (Figure 8 below). Those who chose political rights were more divided over the trade-off question. The proportion of those who saw them as “equally important” was the highest among those who could not make a decision either way on the issue of political rights versus economic circumstances.¹⁷


17 40 percent of those for whom political rights and economic circumstances are equally important said that the open society attribute and the alternatives were equally important in the trade-off question. Among those for whom it was hard to answer the first question, the score was 35 percent.

FIGURE 8

Trade-off between open society attribute “That government-critical groups and individuals can engage in dialogue with the government” and two other concerns

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY OR ARE BOTH EQUALLY IMPORTANT?

(Answers in percentages)



d|part (2018)


The same conclusion can be drawn when contrasting economic wellbeing and social cohesion with the rights of newcomers to Hungary. The picture here is much clearer, though unsurprising, given the objections of the majority of Hungarians to minorities and “otherness”. Sixty-one percent thought that improving economic wellbeing was more important than the equal treatment of newcomers. For 58 percent, social cohesion was more important than protecting the rights of newcomers (see Figure 9).

FIGURE 9

Trade-off between open society attribute “That people who have recently come to live in Hungary should be treated equally” and two other concerns

WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING IS MORE IMPORTANT FOR A GOOD SOCIETY OR ARE BOTH EQUALLY IMPORTANT?

(Answers in percentages)



d|part (2018)

A significant proportion of Hungarians have conflicting views about certain open and/or closed society attributes. While Hungarians care about their rights, they find it almost equally - if not more - important to have economic, political and cultural stability. Also, Hungarians have a majoritarian understanding of democracy, in which the majority is entitled to make exclusive decisions for the whole of society.

These findings reflect one of the interviewees' thoughts on how Hungarians perceive a good society. One political scientist told us: *"A good society fulfils the needs of its members and these needs are different in each country. The strongest societal needs in Hungary right now are peace, calm and moderate material growth. Fundamental rights are important in theory, but not in practice. The real needs are different. There are significant discrepancies in this regard in Hungary."*

We asked our interviewees for a definition of a good society. Several argued that a good society is one able to address and fulfil the needs of its citizens. These needs vary from country to country, and politicians usually try to exploit them for their own political ends.

Our interviewees also argued that historical experience, such as the nature of the transition to democracy, defines the way people think about a good society. A political philosopher we interviewed argued that the biggest failure of Hungary's democratic transition was that it did not succeed in satisfying Hungarians' needs. He ascribed Orbán's success to the fact that he recognised these needs and convinced his voters that his party was the only actor who could fulfil them.

VULNERABILITY TO POPULIST ARGUMENTS

The survey included two questions that allow us to test vulnerability to populist arguments. The first one asks respondents about their general trust towards other people. Since exploiting and fuelling anti-establishment sentiments are key to populist tactics, institutional and interpersonal trust are solid criteria for identifying those people who are the most vulnerable to populism.

Our results have reinforced previous findings about a basic lack of trust in Hungarian society: fifty-seven percent believe that people cannot be trusted, compared to 23 percent who said they can. One quarter of respondents had an extremely low level of trust.¹⁸

Populists like to contrast elites and ordinary citizens, so our second question concerns 'people centrism' that is specific to Hungary: we asked respondents to what extent they agreed with the statement that citizens and not politicians should make the most important policy decisions. Almost half the respondents (49 percent) agreed with the statement, compared to 17 percent who disagreed and 30 percent who neither agreed nor disagreed.

Interestingly, agreement was strongest among supporters of left-wing opposition parties, and weakest among supporters of the governing Fidesz party and the green party LMP. Supporters of Jobbik were in between the two other groups (see Appendix I, table 8 for crosstabulation). There are two possible explanations for this. The first is that left-wing voters tend to think in populist terms, confronting the people with the elites, and preferring decisions by the people over decisions by politicians. The other is that a person's position on the theoretical government-opposition scale determines their trust in politicians.

According to this argument, supporters of left-wing opposition parties, generally the fiercest opponents of Viktor Orbán's government, are the most willing to deprive acting politicians of the task of making policy decisions. Supporters of the governing party, meanwhile, may see the elite as being elsewhere. Populists in government, for example, often appear to prefer to channel social discontent towards international elites and their domestic allies.¹⁹

18 Respondents had to answer the question, "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?", by picking an option on a 0-10 scale, where 0 meant "You can't be too careful" and 10 meant "Most people can be trusted". We considered those who picked an option between 0 to 4 to have answered negatively. The two most extreme negative options were 0 and 1, picked by 25 percent. 17 percent chose the medium option (no. 5), while three percent picked 9 or 10 and 20 percent an option between 6-8. In the 8th round of the European Social Survey – conducted May-September 2017 – Hungarians were asked the same question. Those results showed ([link](#)) slightly more social trust. The share of negative answers was 45 percent, the medium option was picked by 21 percent and 34 percent answered positively. Still, a relative majority did not trust people.

19 For instance, pro-government voters in Poland and Hungary see the national parliament as trustworthy, but do not trust the European Parliament (Péter Krekó, Csaba Molnár, Attila Juhász, Jacek Kucharczyk, & Filip Pazderski, 2018).

Interestingly, those who preferred decisions made by citizens rather than decisions made by politicians tended to have less trust in their fellow citizens. Those who were most determined to make people decide policies trusted others the least. Again, there are two possible explanations for this apparent paradox.

The first is that those who do not trust politicians do not trust people either. A second explanation is that trust plays a crucial role in being anti-establishment; those who do not trust their fellow citizens have lower levels of trust in politicians. This explanation, however, does not resolve the paradox that those who do not trust others nevertheless tend to delegate decisions to the people instead of politicians, whom they supposedly trust even less.

During our interviews, several people evoked polarisation and populism. One sociologist argued that there is no support for democracy in Hungary because democracy had failed to meet the expectations that had been placed on it. This might also explain the success of Fidesz.

Social divisions in Hungary have never run so deep and are multi-layered, she argued, with the most visible probably the urban-rural divide. She explained that Fidesz is promoting a rural counter-revolution aimed at supporting local opinion-formers. These communities are Fidesz's strongest supporters in rural Hungary, and symbolise the power of the party at a local level.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION AND ETHNIC HOMOGENEITY

Hungarians are very keen on cultural homogeneity and strongly object to “otherness”, including that of particular minorities. With migration central to the government’s agenda since 2015, it is important to investigate how government policy has affected attitudes.

In order to do so, we asked specific questions about attitudes towards foreigners and attachment to ethnic homogeneity. In line with previous research²⁰, our survey confirms that the vast majority of Hungarians are opposed to refugees and migrants. Most thought that migration was bad for the economy (according to 53 percent, including 27 percent who picked the two most extreme negative options)²¹ and represented a threat to society as a whole (according to 59 percent, including 42 percent who chose the most extreme options)²².

It is not surprising, then, that limiting immigration is important to a majority of Hungarians²³. Most saw equal treatment of new immigrants as the least important open society value²⁴. Moreover, around 60 percent would trade off this item for improving their economic wellbeing and for safeguarding social cohesion (see Figure 9). The majority of Hungarians would bind citizenship to ethnicity or place of birth. Almost three-quarters (72 percent) thought that in a good society citizenship should be limited to second-generation immigrants, and to ethnic Hungarians.²⁵

20 According to Hungarian pollster institute Tárki, the rate of xenophobes, ie those who would allow no refugees at all to enter Hungary, was 60 percent in November 2017, compared to 39 percent in 2014. According to results from the 8th round of the European Social Survey, 48 percent of Hungarians would allow no one of a different race/ethnic group to live in Hungary, and 62 percent would allow no one from poorer countries outside Europe to live in the country (Ildikó Barna, Bulcsú Hunyadi, Patrik Szicherle, & Farah Rasmi, 2018).

21 22 percent said migration was good for the economy. Respondents had to pick an option on a 0-10 scale: 0 meant extremely bad and 10 meant extremely good. According to our method, those who picked an option between 0 to 4 were considered to have answered “bad”. The two most extreme negative options were 0 and 1. 17 percent picked the medium option (nr. 5), while 4 percent picked 9 or 10 and 18 percent picked an option between 6-8.

22 19 percent said it neither threatens nor enriches society, and 14 percent that it enriches society.

23 The statement that as few immigrants as possible come to Hungary was the second most valued closed society attribute, ranked sixth altogether. It was supported by 78 percent of respondents.

24 This was the least valued open society element, ranked 11th altogether due to a combined support of 64 percent.

25 The statement that the right to citizenship should be limited to people whose parents were already citizens or who were ethnic Hungarians was the 4th most valued closed society item, ranked 10th altogether.



Nevertheless, respondents showed far less hostility to foreigners living in Hungary (see Figure 10). A relative majority (41 percent) did not want non-Hungarians to leave the country, although 27 percent said they should leave, including 15 percent who felt this very strongly. A further significant proportion of respondents (28 percent) could not decide what to say.

FIGURE 10

Ethnic xenophobia among Hungarians

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE STATEMENT: "IT WOULD BE BETTER IF NON-HUNGARIANS LEFT HUNGARY"?

Answers in percentages



d|part (2018)

These results came as no surprise given the government's radical anti-immigration stance. As mentioned in the introduction, before 2015 migration was not a political issue in Hungary. Since then, the government has focused exclusively on the issue for domestic political reasons.

Hungarians' negative attitudes and strong opposition to immigration are undoubtedly a consequence of the government's constant anti-migration propaganda. The readiness to trade off equal treatment of 'newcomers', and the overwhelming preference for linking citizenship to ethnicity or place of birth reflect a wish to remain ethnically homogeneous.

However, the majority of Hungarians do not want to enforce ethnic homogeneity, since they do not think non-Hungarians should leave the country. This may suggest that the level of anti-immigration sentiment and xenophobia is abstract, consciously encouraged by the government. People are far less hostile on a personal level – a possible lesson from other studies as well (TÁRKI Social Research Institute, 2016).

PATRIOTISM AND ETHNIC XENOPHOBIA


PATRIOTISM

The Orbán government is very focused on patriotism. It refers to Hungarians as a big family, meaning all ethnic Hungarians living in Hungary and abroad. To measure the strength of this feeling, we asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement “I feel that Hungarians are one large family and I am one of its members”. The majority of Hungarians (58 percent) agreed to some extent (see Figure 11). Only 16 percent disagreed, while quite a large proportion (23 percent) didn’t commit themselves.

FIGURE 11
Hungarians and patriotism

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE STATEMENT: “I FEEL THAT HUNGARIANS ARE ONE LARGE FAMILY AND I AM ONE OF ITS MEMBERS”?

Answers in percentages



- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree
- I don't know

d|part (2018)

Unsurprisingly, supporters of the governing Fidesz tended to agree with this statement the most. Supporters of Jobbik and leftist parties shared similar views. Figure 12 shows that supporters of the green party LMP were likely to disagree. The more right-


wing people declared themselves to be, the more they agreed with the statement. Centre-left respondents agreed the least, while those on the left of the spectrum were more likely to agree.

FIGURE 12

Patriotic attitudes broken down by party preference and political self-classification on right-left scale

LEVEL OF AGREEMENT WITH THE STATEMENT "I FEEL THAT HUNGARIANS ARE ONE LARGE FAMILY AND I AM ONE OF ITS MEMBERS" ON A SCALE FROM 1-5

Where 1 stands for disagree strongly and 5 is for strongly agree. The orange horizontal line represents the mean in the total sample.



d|part (2018)

While there is no connection between the above statement and open society views, it correlates with closed society attitudes.²⁶ The more people feel they belong to one large Hungarian family, the more they support closed society attributes. They are also more

willing to trade off open society items. Patriotism increases the chance of prioritising closed society views and choosing alternatives to open society views (see Appendix I, table 9 for detailed results).

26 There is no statistically significant difference between the mean of answers to the seven open society attributes, measured within the groups based on their agreement level with the statement "I feel that Hungarians are one large family and I am one of its members". There is a clear difference when it comes to closed society attributes.

Patriots think quite differently on migration issues than those who do not feel they belong to the big family of Hungarians. The more someone agrees with the patriotic statement, the worse they perceived the effects of immigration on the economy to be. They are also more likely to see migration as a threat. For the majority of patriots, it is absolutely essential for a good society that as few immigrants as possible come to Hungary.

ETHNIC XENOPHOBIA

Another aim of our research was to measure ethnic xenophobia. A relatively large proportion of 27 percent agreed with the statement that “It would be better if non-Hungarians left Hungary”, which we consider an openly ethnocentric view. Forty-one percent explicitly opposed ethnic xenophobia.

Right-wing respondents and supporters of Fidesz and Jobbik were more likely to agree with the statement. As Figure 13 clearly shows, a relative majority of both parties' supporters are xenophobic. About half of the centre-left opposition voters clearly disagree, although these groups include a considerable proportion of ethnic xenophobes – around 20 percent.


As shown in Figure 14, the differences are even clearer when looking at left-right ideological orientations. The more respondents positioned themselves to the right, the more they agreed. The attitude of far-left respondents slightly contradicted this trend, as their agreement level was marginally higher than in the centre-left group.

FIGURE 13

Ethnic xenophobia among Hungarians broken down by party preferences

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE STATEMENT “IT WOULD BE BETTER IF NON-HUNGARIANS LEFT HUNGARY”?

Answers in percentages




d|part (2018)

FIGURE 14
Ethnic xenophobia among Hungarians broken down according to political self-classification on left-right scale

DO YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THE STATEMENT “IT WOULD BE BETTER IF NON-HUNGARIANS LEFT HUNGARY”?

Answers in percentages



d|part (2018)

Those who are ethnic-xenophobic are more likely to support closed society views, less likely to support open society views and more willing to trade off open society items for alternatives²⁷ (see Appendix I, table 10 for detailed results).

CONNECTION BETWEEN PATRIOTIC AND ETHNIC XENOPHOBIC ATTITUDES

The more respondents felt they were part of a family of Hungarians, the more they agreed that non-Hungarians should leave the country. Sixty percent of those who disagreed with the first statement also disagreed with the second statement. The share of ethnic xenophobes within this group was 16 percent.

The distribution was much more balanced among patriotic respondents: 35 percent of those who thought they belonged to the large family of Hungarians agreed with the statement that non-Hungarians should leave the country, while 36 percent did not. These 36 percent demonstrate that patriotism does not necessarily imply being ethnic-xenophobic (see Figure 15).


27 We measured support by calculating and standardising the mean of answers to all seven open and closed society attributes respectively. We called the standardised mean of answers an open or closed society standardised score respectively. Regarding ethnic xenophobia, it is the closed society standardised score that varied the most among those who gave different answers to the question that non-Hungarians should leave the country. In the case of the open society score, the variation is much smaller.

FIGURE 15

Ethnic-xenophobic attitudes broken down by patriotic views

“I FEEL THAT HUNGARIANS ARE ONE LARGE FAMILY AND I AM ONE OF ITS MEMBERS” VS. “IT WOULD BE BETTER IF NON-HUNGARIANS LEFT HUNGARY”

Categories "Agree" and "Disagree" include both “strongly” and “somewhat” answers



d|part (2018)

We identified those two groups, who make up a fifth of the whole sample, as “closed patriots” and “open patriots”. They have different views on several issues. Closed patriots are more anti-immigrant, and their level of trust is well below that of the open group. They also rate open society attributes as less important and closed society attributes as more important, and were more likely to prioritise other concerns over open society attributes.

They were also younger than open patriots. On the whole, those with high educational levels were under-represented among closed patriots, as were those with low educational levels among open patriots. Regarding party preferences, Fidesz voters were more numerous among closed patriots (33 percent), followed by Jobbik supporters (27 percent). Fidesz voters were also well represented among open patriots - above average at 28 percent. Yet only 12 percent of Jobbik’s supporters could be described as open patriots.

RECOMMENDATIONS

FRAMING AND NARRATIVES

- To counter polarisation and tribal thinking, emphasis should be placed on what people have in common: those feelings that are widely accepted and respected within the national community and can bind people together. Initiatives should be launched that develop principles, values and interests shared by everyone. These can create a common ground and the foundation for a Hungarian national identity. In their speeches and actions, national (and international) politicians and public officials should refer to this common ground that underpins their actions.
- A new narrative has to be developed that puts the issues concerning disadvantaged and excluded groups into the context of the majority. Solidarity and human rights have to be reframed and presented in a way that shows that defending human rights is in the genuine interests of the majority and of all citizens, even if they do not yet feel personally affected by them.
- Policy-makers and NGO representatives must use plain language and simple words instead of abstract terms and ideas. For instance, instead of human rights, they should talk about right and wrong and use practical examples from people's everyday lives and personal experience.
- Some politicians exploit perceived historical and symbolic wounds because Hungarians have not yet come to terms with their past and feelings of national and personal inferiority. To counter this, public debates about Hungary's past should be encouraged.
- A debating culture should be developed and the exchange of views should be encouraged, so that people learn to accept different viewpoints and to live with them. This could be done through events, like the Lampa conversation festival in Latvia²⁸.
- Instead of migration, political debate should focus on issues that affect citizens' daily lives and that acknowledge their need for stability and security.

28 See more at <https://www.festivalslampa.lv/en>

POLICY MEASURES

- The Hungarian government must stop inciting fear and hatred of refugees and migrants, using conspiracy theories and ambiguous rhetoric about the Roma, and inciting hatred against civil society organisations and their members.
- The Hungarian government must stop using legal, administrative and communications measures to criminalise, intimidate, stigmatise and limit the scope of action and the very existence of human rights defenders.
- Civic education classes should become part of the national school curricula, and educational resources for teachers should be developed to encourage active citizenship. Hungary should introduce the topic and methods in teacher training so that teachers can prepare for the task.
- Anti-discrimination measures should form part of the education agenda and teacher training
- Hungary should create a democratic environment in schools, providing opportunities for students to engage in their communities via social issues, and encouraging student participation in public life.
- Social media companies should be regulated to prevent the spread of misinformation and hate speech and to ensure pluralism.
- A massive nationwide campaign that explains democratic values and civil liberties should be launched. This would also give citizens the opportunity to grasp their rights and different forms of engagement.

GOING LOCAL

- In the long term, community building (besides education) is the only way to achieve real and in-depth social change. Initiatives must be 'apolitical' in the sense that they have to be free of party politics, and avoid, at least in the beginning, divisive political and social issues. Instead, topics should unite people, allowing different members of the community to work together. This approach would allow citizens to improve both their political and social skills (cooperation, trust, mutual respect etc.) and develop a feeling of belonging and ownership. It would also allow them to experience the results of their actions and realise that they can effect change.
- Parties and NGOs have to engage with constituencies in rural areas and on the local level, for instance by developing and maintaining a network of local coordinators, partnering with local communities.
- Social actors, like NGOs and political parties, should offer different levels of engagement, and different "points of entry" to overcome entry barriers. Practical activity can make engagement successful and long-lasting. Various models (including low and high engagement forms) should be developed to encourage people who might have other needs and opportunities to join.
- The basic rule for local engagement must be that fear, mistrust and stereotypes are legitimate feelings and that those who feel them are not "bad". One should discuss them and not condemn those who hold them.
- Community-building efforts - and anti-corruption initiatives on a local level - can also be very important in encouraging local engagement. This can help make corruption feel more tangible and understandable, and encourage citizens to bring about change and overcome symbolic divisions.

CONCLUSION

Democracy, the rule of law and pluralism in Hungary have been dismantled since 2010 by the governing Fidesz party, which is still the country's most popular political party, even though it is supported only by a relative majority of voters.

Voices on Values research helps to understand why Hungarians accept populist and anti-democratic measures. It also provides insights into the effects of the government's nationalist, anti-immigration narrative. Even more than current political circumstances, the results reflect the manner in which democracy came about in Hungary and the country's evolution since.

Our research depicts a society that in theory values civil liberties but in practice holds conflicting and sometimes contradictory views of what constitutes a good society. Hungarians do not trust institutions or other people, and they yearn for economic, political, social and cultural stability.

This desire for stability generally overrides their commitment to the civil rights that are the very foundations of democracy. Hungarians also have a majoritarian understanding of democracy, according to which the majority is entitled to make exclusive decisions for the whole of society.

Our research - and that of others - has confirmed the level of anti-immigration sentiments and Hungarians' very negative view of migration and immigrants. This is probably a result of the government's continuous anti-migration propaganda since 2015, which is promoted by government-organised media outlets, including the state media.

Although a number of respondents wanted to preserve Hungarian ethnicity, only a minority wanted to see ethnic homogeneity actually enforced. This suggests that the level of anti-immigration and xenophobic sentiments is an abstract phenomenon, consciously incited by the government but not deeply felt.

METHODOLOGY

We collected original qualitative and quantitative data for this report. A representative survey, administered using online panels and quota-sampling methods was conducted among over 6,000 respondents across Europe, of which 1,008 were from Hungary. The online survey was carried out between February 12 and March 5, 2018.

The survey first asked respondents to rate the importance of seven statements reflecting values that the researchers identified as characteristics of open societies, such as the equal treatment of newcomers, freedom of speech and minority rights. Respondents were asked to do the same for seven characteristics that tend to appear in closed societies, such as limiting immigration and citizenship rights. The decision about what items to include was taken by the researchers from the six countries involved, who aimed to include key issues in current political debates in all countries. A full discussion of the conceptual ideas behind these decisions and the debates they correspond to can be found in the project's publication "Voices on Values: How

European publics and policy actors value an open society"²⁹ which sets out the detailed rationale and includes a full list of items.

After analysing how people evaluated both different characteristics associated with open and closed societies in their own right, we tested how robust people's evaluations of the former were when juxtaposed with other concerns. For this purpose, in the second part of the survey, we presented respondents with the seven characteristics associated with open societies again, this time opposed to other concerns people might have, such as economic security, political stability or the protection of cultural traditions. Respondents were then asked to evaluate the relative importance of the two alternative choices: they could choose one or the other as more important or say that both were equally important. These trade-off experiments are artificial in the sense that they contrast values and concerns which are not necessarily in contradiction, but which are often presented that way in current public debates³⁰.

29 Cf. Eichhorn, J., Kupsch, V., Molthof, L. and Mohr, M. (2019). *Voices on Values: How European publics and elites value an open society*. Open Society European Public Institute and d|part.

30 Cf. *ibid.*

Additionally, general and country-specific correlate questions were asked that could be used for further analyses. Based on dimension reduction techniques³¹ we could identify two separate factors (open and closed society attributes respectively) that were only weakly correlated with each other. We therefore computed two summary measures that combine the scores for each set of seven items and that are used in our analyses. For full details, please refer to the *Voices on Values* publication “The Hidden Majority: How most Europeans care about open society values”³².

We also conducted interviews with experts. In Hungary we conducted 11 semi-structured interviews. Participants included academic researchers, politicians, civic activists and sociologists. We asked respondents to discuss what they perceived as the challenges to an open society in Hungary. We also discussed findings from the survey to identify possible dissonances between their views and those of the public.

31 For further information on the methods applied in this study, visit <http://voicesonvalues.dpart.org>

32 Cf. Eichhorn, J. and Mohr, M. (2019) *The Hidden Majority: How most Europeans care about open society values*. Open Society European Public Institute and d|part.

APPENDIX I

TABLE 1.1
Correlations between open society attributes

	That people who have recently come to live in Hungary should be treated equally	That everyone can practice their religion freely	That everyone can express their opinion freely	That government-critical groups and individuals can engage in dialogue with the government	That the rights of minorities are protected	That all political views of the population can be represented in parliament	That the media can criticise the government
That people who have recently come to live in Hungary should be treated equally	1	0.383	0.225	0.278	0.458	0.202	0.182
That everyone can practice their religion freely	0.383	1	0.469	0.384	0.516	0.311	0.239
That everyone can express their opinion freely	0.225	0.469	1	0.515	0.378	0.411	0.394
That government-critical groups and individuals can engage in dialogue with the government	0.278	0.384	0.515	1	0.446	0.481	0.550
That the rights of minorities are protected	0.458	0.516	0.378	0.446	1	0.335	0.288
That all political views of the population can be represented in parliament	0.202	0.311	0.411	0.481	0.335	1	0.465
That the media can criticise the government	0.182	0.239	0.394	0.550	0.288	0.465	1

TABLE 1.2**Correlations between closed society attributes**

	That as few immigrants as possible come to Hungary	That the government ensures media reporting always reflects a positive image of Hungary	That everyone lives by the national values and norms of Hungary	That Non-Christians only visibly practice their religion at home and their places of religious worship	That same sex couples do not kiss each other in public	That the views of the government always represent the views of the majority of people in the country	That the right to citizenship in Hungary is limited to people whose parents hold Hungarian citizenship or who are ethnically Hungarian.
That as few immigrants as possible come to Hungary	1	0.348	0.449	0.339	0.364	0.328	0.359
That the government ensures media reporting always reflects a positive image of Hungary	0.348	1	0.241	0.222	0.223	0.163	0.260
That everyone lives by the national values and norms of Hungary	0.449	0.241	1	0.325	0.287	0.376	0.317
That Non-Christians only visibly practice their religion at home and their places of religious worship	0.339	0.222	0.325	1	0.421	0.191	0.339
That same sex couples do not kiss each other in public	0.364	0.223	0.287	0.421	1	0.149	0.308
That the views of the government always represent the views of the majority of people in the country	0.328	0.163	0.376	0.191	0.149	1	0.292
That the right to citizenship in Hungary is limited to people whose parents hold Hungarian citizenship or who are ethnically Hungarian.	0.359	0.260	0.317	0.339	0.308	0.292	1

TABLE 1.3

Correlations between open and closed society attributes

	That as few immigrants as possible come to Hungary	That the government ensures media reporting always reflects a positive image of Hungary	That everyone lives by the national values and norms of Hungary	That Non-Christians only visibly practice their religion at home and their places of religious worship	That same sex couples do not kiss each other in public	That the views of the government always represent the views of the majority of people in the country	That the right to citizenship in Hungary is limited to people whose parents hold Hungarian citizenship or who are ethnically Hungarian.
That people who have recently come to live in Hungary should be treated equally	-0.225	-0.005	-0.080	-0.120	-0.218	0.028	-0.183
That everyone can practice their religion freely	0.007	-0.001	0.099	-0.090	-0.090	0.202	0.034
That everyone can express their opinion freely	0.073	-0.011	0.209	0.018	-0.070	0.356	0.089
That government-critical groups and individuals can engage in dialogue with the government	-0.062	-0.116	0.148	-0.021	-0.088	0.275	0.065
That the rights of minorities are protected	-0.106	-0.029	0.098	-0.021	-0.082	0.181	-0.068
That all political views of the population can be represented in parliament	-0.032	0.002	0.136	0.008	-0.069	0.247	0.056
That the media can criticise the government	-0.079	-0.139	0.188	0.001	-0.089	0.210	0.009

TABLE 2**Open and closed society scores within selected societal groups**

Standardized sum scores on a scale of 0-1, where higher number represent stronger emphasis

	OPEN SOCIETY SCORE	CLOSED SOCIETY SCORE
Gender		
Females	0.780	0.669
Males	0.752	0.640
Highest level of education		
Low educational attainment	0.676	0.613
Medium educational attainment	0.770	0.683
High educational attainment	0.809	0.595
Party preference		
Fidesz-KDNP	0.705	0.764
Jobbik	0.723	0.663
MSZP-P-Együtt-MLP	0.786	0.559
Demokratikus Koalíció	0.876	0.617
LMP	0.812	0.566

TABLE 3**Evaluation of selected values**

Crosstabulation of Item 1: the media can criticize the government and Item 2: the government ensures media reporting always reflects a positive image of Hungary, in per cent.

		ITEM 2				
		Absolutely essential	Rather essential	Rather not essential	Not at all essential	Total
ITEM 1	Absolutely essential	20	23	25	31	100
	Rather essential	13	51	25	11	100
	Rather not essential	17	36	38	9	100
	Not at all essential	37	29	5	29	100

TABLE 4

Evaluation of the closed society value: the government ensures media reporting always reflects a positive image of Hungary broken down by preferred party, in per cent

	ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL	RATHER ESSENTIAL	RATHER NOT ESSENTIAL	NOT AT ALL ESSENTIAL	TOTAL
Fidesz-KDNP	25	45	22	9	100
Jobbik	18	29	30	23	100
MSZP-P-Együtt-MLP	11	29	30	31	100
Demokratikus Koalíció	22	26	23	29	100
LMP	7	25	39	29	100

TABLE 5

Xenophobic attitudes broken down by the evaluation of positive media reporting

Distribution of answers to the question "It would be better if non-Hungarians left Hungary" broken down by the evaluation of the closed society value: the government ensures media reporting always reflects a positive image of Hungary, in per cent.

	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DK/NA	TOTAL
Absolutely essential	22	15	29	15	12	6	100
Rather essential	16	18	29	20	12	4	100
Rather not essential	14	8	31	28	18	1	100
Not at all essential	9	7	22	26	31	4	100

TABLE 6**Patriotic attitudes broken down by the evaluation of positive media reporting**

Distribution of answers to the question “I feel like Hungarians are one large family and I am one of its members” broken down by the evaluation of the closed society value: the government ensures media reporting always reflects a positive image of Hungary, in per cent.

	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DK/NA	TOTAL
Absolutely essential	52	19	19	5	1	4	100
Rather essential	40	25	20	8	3	3	100
Rather not essential	25	27	27	12	8	1	100
Not at all essential	23	22	25	16	11	4	100

TABLE 7**Perceptions of freedom of opinion broken down by the evaluation of positive media reporting**

Crosstabulation of Item 1: the government ensures media reporting always reflects a positive image of Hungary and Item 2: Everyone can express their opinion freely, in per cent.

		ITEM 2				
		Absolutely essential	Rather essential	Rather not essential	Not at all essential	Total
ITEM 1	Absolutely essential	78	18	4	0	100
	Rather essential	66	28	2	4	100
	Rather not essential	73	21	6	0	100
	Not at all essential	79	15	4	3	100

TABLE 8**People centrist attitudes broken down by preferred party, in per cent**

Distribution of answers to the question “The people and not politicians should make our most important policy decisions” broken down by preferred party, in per cent.

	STRONGLY AGREE	SOMEWHAT AGREE	NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE	SOMEWHAT DISAGREE	STRONGLY DISAGREE	DK/NA	TOTAL
Fidesz-KDNP	17	25	30	14	14	0	100
Jobbik	32	20	28	8	3	7	100
MSZP-P-Együtt-MLP	31	35	20	7	7	0	100
Demokratikus Koalíció	39	30	26	4	0	1	100
LMP	17	26	32	15	9	0	100

TABLE 9**Closed society scores and trade-off willingness scores broken down by patriotic attitudes**

Standardized sum scores on a scale of 0-1, where higher number represents stronger emphasis for closed society attributes and higher willingness to trade-off open society attributes. Scores are broken down by answers to the question “I feel like Hungarians are one large family and I am one of its members”.

	CLOSED SOCIETY SCORE	TRADE-OFF WILLINGNESS SCORE
Strongly agree	0.744	0.489
Somewhat agree	0.679	0.459
Neither agree nor disagree	0.600	0.433
Somewhat disagree	0.550	0.410
Strongly disagree	0.399	0.321

TABLE 10**Open and closed society scores and trade-off willingness scores broken down by xenophobic attitudes**

Standardized sum scores on a scale of 0-1, where higher number represents stronger emphasis for open or closed society attributes and higher willingness to trade-off open society attributes. Scores are broken down by answers to the question "It would be better if non-Hungarians left Hungary".

	OPEN SOCIETY SCORE	CLOSED SOCIETY SCORE	TRADE-OFF WILLINGNESS SCORE
Strongly agree	0.670	0.770	0.511
Somewhat agree	0.693	0.750	0.505
Neither agree nor disagree	0.769	0.693	0.458
Somewhat disagree	0.816	0.602	0.427
Strongly disagree	0.814	0.482	0.380

APPENDIX II

HUNGARY'S POLITICAL PARTIES

- Fidesz-KDNP: party alliance between 'The Alliance of Young Democrats' (Fidesz) and the 'Christian Democratic People's Party' (KDNP). Even though it is formally a party alliance, in reality KDNP is a faction of Fidesz. It is a national conservative and right-wing populist block.
- Jobbik (The Movement for a Better Hungary): originally a far-right, ultra-nationalist party, which has been moderating its tone and policy positions and in recent years has positioned itself as a mainstream conservative party.
- MSZP-P: A cooperation between the 'Hungarian Socialist Party' and the 'Dialogue', a social-democratic, centre-left bloc.
- LMP (Politics Can be Different): a green-leftist party, opposed both to Fidesz and to possible cooperation with left-wing and liberal opposition parties.
- DK (Democratic Coalition): centre-left, socially liberal party of former socialist Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány.
- Együtt: former liberal party, which dissolved after the parliamentary elections in 2018.
- MLP: A marginal liberal party with popular support of 1 percent at most.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

d|part. (2018). Voices on Values Survey (February-March 2018).

Attila Juhász, Csaba Molnár, & Edit Zgut. (2017). Refugees, Asylum and Migration Issues in Hungary. Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Political Capital. Retrieved from http://politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/HUNGARY_BOOK_ENG_BOOK_ONLINE.pdf

Csaba Molnár, & Veszna Wessenauer. (2018, July 10). Young Hungarians 2018 - Passive supporters of democracy. Retrieved 26 September 2018, from <http://situationroom.dpart.org/index.php/blog/18-article-themes/hungary/50-young-hungarians-2018>

Ferge, Zs. (1996). A rendszerváltás nyertesei és vesztesei. Retrieved from <http://old.tarki.hu/adatbank-h/kutjel/pdf/a896.pdf>

"Fidesz most likely gained another two-thirds majority" (2018). Retrieved 24 September 2018, from http://www.politicalcapital.hu/news.php?article_read=1&article_id=2248

Ildikó Barna, Bulcsú Hunyadi, Patrik Szicherle, & Farah Rasmi. (2018). *Report on Xenophobia, Radicalism and Hate Crime in Hungary in 2017*.

Keller, T. (2013). *Értékek 2013. Bizalom, normakövetés, az állam szerepéről és a a demokráciáról alkotott vélemények alakulása Magyarországon. „A gazdasági növekedés társadalmi/kulturális feltételei” c. kutatás 2013. évi hullámának elemzések*. TÁRKI. Retrieved from http://www.tarki.hu/hu/research/gazdkult/2013/2013_zarotanutmany_gazd_kultura.pdf

Messing, V., & Bernáth, G. (2015). Bedarálva - A menekültekkel kapcsolatos kormányzati kampány és a tôle független megszólalás terei [Minced - The government's campaign concerning the refugees and other opportunities to speak]. *Médiakutató*, (Winter). Retrieved from http://www.mediakutato.hu/cikk/2015_04_tel/01_menekultek_moralis_panic.pdf

Nick Thorpe (2017). 'Does the Soros plan really exist?' BBC Interview with Zoltán Kovács. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fkY5seBonFM>

Péter Krekó, Csaba Molnár, Attila Juhász, Jacek Kucharczyk, & Filip Pazderski. (2018). Beyond Populism - Tribalism in Poland and Hungary. Political Capital. Retrieved from http://www.politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/pc_beyond_populism_study_20180731.pdf

Political Capital. (2018). Derex Index. Retrieved 26 September 2018, from <http://derexindex.eu/countries/Hungary#Hungary>

Szicherle P., & Wessenauer V. (2017). A média és a politika új viszonya Magyarországon. Political Capital and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. Retrieved from http://www.politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/FES_PC_A_media_es_a_politika_uj_kapcsolata%20171004.pdf

Sík, D. (2014). Demokratikus kultúra és modernizáció - Állampolgári szocializáció 20 évvel a rendszerváltás után (L'Harmattan kiadó).

TÁRKI Social Research Institute. (2016, March). The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration crisis in Hungary. Retrieved from http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2016/kitekint/20160330_refugees.pdf

Tóth, I. G. (2009). Bizalomhiány, normazavarok, igazságtalanságérzet és paternalizmus a magyar társadalom értékstruktúrájában. TÁRKI. Retrieved from <http://www.tarki.hu/adatbank-h/kutjel/pdf/b268.pdf>

"Why some European countries are more hostile to immigrants than others" (2017). Retrieved 24 September 2018, from <https://www.mcgill.ca/newsroom/channels/news/why-some-european-countries-are-more-hostile-immigrants-others-283101>

Zgut, E. (Ed.). (2018). Illiberalism in the V4: Pressure Points and Bright Spots. Political Capital, Friedrich Naumann Stiftung. Retrieved from http://politicalcapital.hu/pc-admin/source/documents/pc_fnf_v4illiberalism_pressurepoints_20180605.pdf

AUTHORS

Bulcsú Hunyadi, Senior analyst, Political Capital

Bulcsú heads Political Capital's programme on radicalism and right-wing extremism. His research areas include far-right and populist arguments, prevention of radicalism, anti-Roma sentiments and anti-Semitism. He also covers civic education and contributes to research on civil society and the attitudes of Hungarian youth.

Csaba Molnár, Head of Research, Quantitative Analyst, Political Capital

Csaba develops methodologies for Political Capital's quantitative research projects and analyses quantitative data. He is also involved in the modelling of political and societal processes, creating indices, data visualisation and social media analysis.

Veszna Wessenauer, Analyst and Project Manager, Political Capital

Veszna's research areas include civil society and attitudes among young people.

We would like to thank the research team of d|part and Open Society European Policy Institute for their support and help throughout the research.

**OPEN SOCIETY
EUROPEAN POLICY
INSTITUTE**

