THE HIDDEN MAJORITY

HOW MOST EUROPEANS CARE ABOUT OPEN SOCIETY VALUES

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This study forms part of *Voices on Values: How European publics and policy actors value an open society,* a joint project by the Open Society European Policy Institute and d|part. The project was launched in September 2017 in Germany, France, Italy, Greece, Poland and Hungary. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Across Europe, far right and populist movements and parties are challenging core values and principles on which the European Union and liberal democracies are based. It seems that what Karl Popper once defined as an open society – one in which no one has a monopoly on the truth, and where there is respect for the rule of law, civil rights, minority rights and the institutions that safeguard them – is under attack.

To what extent do current debates about values in Europe reflect the views of the general public? Do Europeans still support open society values?

Using robust analytical tools, the *Voices on Values* project conducted an empirical assessment of how Europeans rate open society values and other concerns that are increasingly portrayed as being in contradiction to those values. The researchers surveyed and interviewed more than 6,000 people across Germany, France, Hungary, Poland, Italy and Greece using an experimental design that tested both ranking of values, coherence between values sets and potential trade-offs against other concerns. The results reveal that open society values have broader support among Europeans than often assumed. *Voices on Values* data demonstrates that the common assumption that people are either for or against open society values is not true for the majority of Europeans.

Instead, many Europeans value both values associated with open societies - such as freedom of expression, freedom of religion and press freedom - and also characteristics commonly associated with more closed societies, such as ethnocentric citizenship models and a strong focus on the protection of national interests and values at the expense of minorities. By challenging common preconceptions about people's values, our findings offer policy-makers and civil society a chance to engage with citizens more effectively.

There is some variation across countries, but the *Voices on Values* data reveals that a large majority (an average of 91 per cent) of Europeans considers values such as the rule of law, pluralism, the protection of individual freedoms and rights as essential for a good society. Above all, Europeans value freedom of expression and press freedom, with 61 and 47 per cent respectively considering it very essential for a society. Indeed, while many people value a range of characteristics associated with a more closed society, most of them (59 per cent overall) also rate open society values highly. Moreover, a significant minority of 32 per cent of Europeans strongly values open society principles, but rejects principles of more closed societies. Five per cent of Europeans cherish only the values of a closed society. This suggests that even though not everyone rejects the attributes of closed societies, more people cherish open society values than is often assumed.

What determines people's attitudes towards values is more complex than often assumed, and also differs substantially across countries. Socio-demographic factors, such as age or education levels, may help predict people's attitudes towards open society values but not how they think about closed society values in one country. Yet in another these might not be a useful predictor. Education, for example, is linked to a stronger commitment to open society values in most countries, but not to how people rate closed society attributes in five of the six countries surveyed.

Attitudes towards migration and political orientation are more consistent predictors. Across all of the countries, respondents who thought migration was good for the economy were more likely to value an open society highly and less likely to share closed society views. Equally, respondents who placed themselves on the political left were more likely to evaluate open society values as important in most countries and – across all countries – less likely to hold closed society attitudes.

Because these determinants of attitudes are different, we recommend that advocacy groups and policy-makers use country-specific approaches to identify and address their target audiences. These approaches should allow them to take into account all the factors affecting attitudes.

To help policy-makers and advocacy groups develop more targeted engagement strategies, we developed a typology that distinguishes between three groups of people with distinct attitudes: *open society prioritisers*, *open society sympathisers and open society de-prioritisers*. Based on trade-off experiments, which contrast open society values with other common concerns, such as economic security, political stability and protection of cultural traditions, this typology offers a more comprehensive understanding of European attitudes towards values.

Open society prioritisers are the respondents who consistently rate open society values as more important than other concerns, such as economic security, political stability or the protection of cultural traditions. Open society *de-prioritisers*, conversely, tend to trade off open society values for other concerns.

A substantial third group of some 21 to 35 per cent of respondents in each country, whom we label "*open society sympathisers*", considers open society values to be as important as other concerns but does not favour closed society views. This group is often assumed, wrongly, by politicians and civil society leaders to be advocates of closed societies - or at least receptive to such rhetoric. Contrary to this widespread belief, our research demonstrates that this group has much in common with open society *prioritisers*, the more straightforward advocates of an open society. In fact, open society *sympathisers* are, for example, as likely as open society *prioritisers* to say that the rights of minorities should be protected and that newly arrived immigrants should be treated equally.

Based on this finding, our research suggests that there is a far larger constituency of open society supporters than generally assumed. This report offers insights into the convictions and values of these people. It tells us that actors trying to promote civil liberties and human rights need a more nuanced approach and to engage in a more positive way with people who cherish open society ideals, but who are nevertheless concerned about other issues - instead of assuming them to be xenophobic or illiberal.

This means that researchers cannot use over-simplistic measurements when examining people's attitudes towards open and closed society values. Since we cannot presume to know a person's attitudes towards an open society simply because we know their views on closed society questions, they need to be measured and examined separately.

INTRODUCTION

The rise of xenophobic politicians across Europe has increased the use of prejudiced, anti-immigrant language in public statements and in the media.

Germany's anti-immigrant Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has seen a steady increase in its approval ratings since it entered the Bundestag in 2017. In Italy, two populist and anti-EU parties form the ruling coalition. In France, the far-right Rassemblement National (formerly Front National) remains a strong force in politics.

Greece's neo-fascist Golden Dawn is the third largest party in the Hellenic parliament. In Hungary, after having been elected for a fourth term in 2018, Viktor Orbán's Fidesz government has introduced legislation to criminalise support to refugees. Poland has seen a progressive restriction of fundamental rights under the far-right Law and Justice Party (PiS).

These developments have challenged some of the core values on which the European Union is based – the rule of law, individual freedoms, pluralism and the protection of minorities. Formally enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union,[1] these values and principles are not novel or exclusive to the EU but emerged from the Western philosophical tradition of liberal democracy. By the mid-20th century, philosophers such as Karl Popper came to understand these values and principles as forming a values set which underpins an 'open society.'[2]

According to Popper, an open society is one in which no one has a monopoly on the truth and in which the rule of law, civil rights and the institutions that protect them are respected.

These political developments in Europe and across the Atlantic have led numerous scholars and commentators, among them Yascha Mounk, Edward Luce and Madeleine Albright, to argue that many of these values are endangered, and that Western liberal democracy itself is under attack.[3] But to what extent do current political debates and discourse reflect the views of the general public? What does an open society mean to Europeans? How different are attitudes towards values between and within countries? Are there clues that could increase engagement on open society values with people who may be attracted to xenophobic and anti-immigrant rhetoric? How polarised is public opinion on matters relating to values?

Often discussions on this theme are framed in absolutes, with people presented as either becoming more or less open, or more or less authoritarian. While such characterisations have a straightforward appeal, they often presuppose the values people think a good society should have and therefore tend to be biased and, as a result, of questionable validity. Instead of making such assumptions, in this report we empirically assess how people in different European countries rate the values associated with

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1   European Union (2007) Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, 13 December 2007, 2007/C 306/01, Art. 2.

2   See e.g.: Luce, E (2017). *The retreat of western liberalism.* New York: Atlantic Monthly Press; Mounk, Y. (2018) *The People vs Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is In Danger and How to Save It.* Harvard University Press; Ikenberry, G. J. (2018). *The end of liberal international order?* International Affairs 94: 1, 7–23.

3   Popper, K.(1945) *The Open Society and Its Enemies.* Routledge.

open societies. Do they look at them as one set of values or do they pick and choose freely between them? Do people who value human rights that affect everyone (such as the freedom of expression) also care about the protection of minorities? Do people who attach great importance to such values reject characteristics of more exclusive or closed societies (such as a strong inward-looking national focus or authoritarian forms of government)?

Taking this approach allows us to deepen our understanding of how people actually evaluate values in society. In fact, our research reveals that public views are much more nuanced and complex than often suggested. Most people are neither exclusively supporters of an open society, nor do they want to see it destroyed.

Earlier studies have often identified different degrees of support for more open or closed society value sets. However, most of these evaluations position people in a tension that follows a one-dimensional spectrum with two extreme endpoints. David Goodhart[4] popularly characterises people as being either cosmopolitan "Anywheres", who have access to and are open to a world beyond national borders, or communitarian "Somewheres", who focus on their local context and are sceptical about globalised metropolitan elites. The research project "More in Common"[5] produces in-depth segmentation analyses that distinguish "liberal cosmopolitans" at one end of the spectrum from "radical opponents"

at the other end of the spectrum and identifies three groups in between. Similarly, Bornschier[6] suggests that the key cleavage of Western European political debate centres around a cultural divide between "Cosmopolitans" on the one hand and "Communitarians" on the other.

All of these characterisations are plausible and intuitive. They also appear to reflect many elements of the often polarising political discourses that are driven by messages at the extreme end of the spectrum, especially by political actors such as those cited at the beginning of this report. But are people really as polarised in their thinking as the political discourse suggests? In other words, does the strong and increased polarisation in discussions about values between political actors reflect how people really think about these values? Can we be confident that a one-dimensional spectrum with two extreme poles really allows us to characterise people's value sets?

This *Voices on Values* report examines those questions critically and looks at people's views in their own right, rather than through the lens of the dominant discourse. Through an empirical assessment, it offers fresh insights into how people in Europe feel about values that may be associated with an open society. It is aimed at policy-makers and civil society organisations that want to engage with publics better by understanding them in more depth.

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4   Goodhart, D. (2017). *The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics*. London: C. Hurst & Co.

5   More in Common. (2018). *Our Publications*. Available at https://www.moreincommon.com/publications/ (Accessed 5 December 2018).

6   Bornschier, S. (2010). *Cleavage Politics and the Populist Right: The New Cultural Conflict in Western Europe.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH APPROACH

For the purpose of this research project, we draw on both Article 2 TEU and Popper to examine attitudes towards freedoms (e.g. freedom of religion, of speech and of the press), individual rights and their protection (e.g. minority rights), as well as the principles of pluralism, tolerance and non-discrimination. In the following study, we will refer to these as "open society values."

The *Voices on Values* online survey was carried out between February 12 and March 5, 2018 with a representative sample of over 6,000 people in Hungary, Poland, Greece, Italy, France and Germany (just over 1000 per country). Its questionnaire was developed by d|part in close cooperation with the six country partners of the project, and addressed two basic questions:

- How do people evaluate the values associated with more open or closed societies respectively?

- How do people respond when asked if a particular value of open societies is more, less or equally important than another concern, such as economic security, political stability or cultural traditions?

The survey was divided into four main sections. In the first, respondents were asked to rate the importance of seven statements reflecting values that the researchers identified as characteristics of open societies, such as the equal treatment of newcomers, freedom of speech and minority rights. Respondents were asked to do the same for seven characteristics that tend to appear in closed societies, such as limiting immigration and citizenship rights (see Table 1 for the full list). The order of all fourteen attributes was fully randomised when presented to respondents. The decision about which attributes to include was taken by the researchers from the six countries involved, who aimed to include key issues in current political debates in all countries. A full discussion of the conceptual ideas behind these decisions and the debates they correspond to can be found in the project's *Key Insights Report,*[7] which sets out the detailed rationale.

While the project researchers had ideas about which characteristics theoretically correspond with each other as a coherent set of values, our research design allowed us to examine how people evaluated those different attributes without making any

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7   The Key Insights Report will be published in February 2019 and made available at http://voicesonvalues.dpart.org.

prior assumptions about how respondents saw the relationships between them. We wanted to explore how people who rate certain attributes as essential for a good society also rated others. In other words, we wanted to see whether there were any particular patterns in how people viewed these 14 different attributes, and whether these patterns suggested that we could group certain sets of them together.

These insights can be achieved through a dimension reduction analysis,[8] which looks at the relationships between the evaluations of all 14 characteristics. The initial analysis reveals strong connections between each set of characteristics, but little connection between the two sets. In other words, people who rated some attributes commonly associated with open societies as very essential for a good society were also likely to rate other open society attributes highly. The same applied to the seven characteristics commonly associated with more closed societies.

However, there was little relationship between the sets of open society attributes on the one hand and closed society attributes on the other, with respondents sometimes choosing attributes from both sets.

This in itself is an important insight. People evaluate characteristics that democratic theory associates with open societies rather consistently (and the same applies to the closed society attributes). This means that it makes sense to discuss perceptions of people's views on values based on the empirical evidence. This finding applies in all six countries. Based on these analyses, we computed two summative scores, reflecting how strongly people rated the open- and closed-society characteristics respectively. These scores were then used for further analyses, for instance to understand how views differ across age or education levels.[9]

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8   The techniques we applied followed exploratory factor analysis designs. This allowed us to analyse how the fourteen different attributes related to each other. Thus we were able to identify the evaluations of which attributes correlated strongly with the evaluations of other attributes. Those attributes that were strongly related to each other could therefore be understood to all reflect an underlying latent concept. For details of the statistical results, please refer to the online appendix to this report on http://voicesonvalues.dpart.org.

9   Details about the computation can be found in the online appendix on http://voicesonvalues.dpart.org

TABLE 1

Evaluations of open and closed society attributes

ATTRIBUTES ASSOCIATED WITH MORE OPEN SOCIETIES	ATTRIBUTES ASSOCIATED WITH MORE CLOSED SOCIETIES
People who have recently come to live in [COUNTRY] should be treated equally	As few immigrants as possible should come to [COUNTRY]
Everyone can practise their religion	The government must ensure media reporting always reflects a positive image of [COUNTRY]
Everyone can express their opinion	Everyone must respect the national values and norms of [COUNTRY]
Government-critical groups and individuals can engage in dialogue with the government	Non-Christians can only practise their religion at home or in their places of worship
The rights of minorities are protected	Same sex couples should not kiss in public
All political views can be represented in parliament	The views of the government always represent the views of the majority
Media can criticise the government	The right to citizenship in [COUNTRY] is limited to people whose parents hold [COUNTRY ADJECTIVE] citizenship or are ethnically [COUNTRY ADJECTIVE]

The order of all 14 attributes was randomised in the survey and respondents were asked how essential each attribute was for a good society in their view.

Answer options:
• Absolutely essential
• Rather essential
• Rather not essential
• Not at all essential

After analysing how people evaluated different characteristics associated with open and closed societies in their own right, we wanted to see how robust people's evaluations of the former were when juxtaposed with other concerns. For this purpose, in the second part of the survey, we presented respondents with the seven characteristics associated with open societies again, this time opposed to other concerns people might have, such as economic security, political stability or the protection of cultural traditions.

Respondents were then asked to evaluate the relative importance of the two alternative choices: they could choose one or the other as more important, or say that both were equally important. Each open society attribute was contrasted with two other concerns (14 in total) and the order in which they were presented to the respondents was randomised. The comparisons are presented in Table 2.

By asking respondents to assess the importance of open society values both on their own and vis-à-vis alternative aspirations, we addressed what we believe is a shortcoming in most studies of social attitudes. They are frequently studied in a vacuum rather than acknowledging the complexity of real-life situations, in which values are evaluated in conjunction with other concerns and may at times be (or are perceived to be) in conflict.

TABLE 2

Trade-off questions

Question: Not all aspects of society are viewed as equally important by all. You will now see a list of statements and we would like you to say which of two options you find more important for a good society or whether you find both equally important.

Which of the following is more important for a good society or are both equally important?

ATTRIBUTES ASSOCIATED WITH MORE OPEN SOCIETIES	OTHER CONCERN PRESENTED
That people who have recently come to live in [COUNTRY OF RESPONDENT] should be treated equally	That state policies always aim at improving the economic well-being of its citizens
	That social cohesion is safeguarded
That everyone may practise their religion	That [COUNTRY]'s cultural traditions and values are protected
	That all people living in [COUNTRY] share the same cultural values
That everyone can express their opinion	That Christian values are not offended
	That ethnic and national minorities are not offended
That government-critical groups and individuals can engage in dialogue with the government	That the government ensures political stability
	That government policy always focuses on maximising economic growth
That the rights of minorities are protected	That the state ensures that the interests of the majority are safeguarded
	That the state ensures its citizens never feel foreign in their own country
That all political views can be represented in parliament	That all parties represented in parliament adhere to democratic principles
	That there is always a stable majority within parliament
That the media can criticise the government	That the government has a free hand in implementing its policies decisively
	That government decision-making is mostly guided by experts

Answer options:
1. [Option 1: Open society attribute] Clearly more important
2. [Option 1: Open society attribute] A little more important
3. Both equally important
4. [Option 2: Other concern] A little more important
5. [Option 2: Other concern] Clearly more important

In the survey's third section, respondents were asked about their attitudes towards immigration, civil society and their political affiliations. Finally, the fourth section featured questions specific to each of the six research countries.

RESULTS SECTION 1: UNDERSTANDING OPEN AND CLOSED SOCIETY SUPPORTERS

FOR MOST PEOPLE, CHARACTERISTICS OF OPEN AND CLOSED SOCIETIES ARE NOT OPPOSITES

In terms of democratic theory, it makes conceptual sense to think about open and closed society values as opposites. This seems to allow a clear distinction between cosmopolitans and nationalists, or progressives and traditionalists, by assuming that people who rate characteristics of open societies highly would rate characteristics of closed societies poorly – and vice versa.

Figure 1 shows that things are not that simple. There are people who indeed fit the pattern suggested by theory, but many others do not. The figure shows the open society and closed society scores of all respondents in the six countries surveyed (based on their evaluation of attributes in Table 1).

Importance of open and closed society attributes (scatterplot)

People who gave a high rating to open society values (i.e. considered them very important) did not necessarily give a low rating to closed society values. This means that there are two other types of respondents other than undisputed "friends" (who value open societies highly, but those of closed societies poorly) or "opponents" of open society values (who rate values of a closed society highly, but those of open societies poorly). The former group can be found in the bottom-right corner of the figure (box 1), while the latter can be found in the top-left (box 3).

Those who rated values of both open and closed society values as important can be seen in the top right-hand corner of the graph (box 2); those who deemed neither of them important are in the bottom left corner (box 4). To put it simply, there are many people for whom open and closed society attributes

are not contradictory. They are happy to rate both as equally important or unimportant for a good society.

This finding is true in all six countries, albeit to a slightly different extent (table 3). In five countries (all except Germany) the most common position of respondents lies in the top-right box (2). This means that many people evaluate several open society values and some closed society characteristics as both being essential for a good society. This applies to 59 per cent overall, ranging from 44 per cent in Germany and 48 per cent in France to majorities in Poland (58), Italy (65) and Greece (68) and, with the greatest proportion overall, in Hungary at 73 per cent. Crucially, this shows that many people do not see values theoretically associated with open or closed societies respectively as opposites, or mutually exclusive.

TABLE 3

Evaluations of different value sets by country (row percentages)

BOX	1	2	3	4
VALUE SCORES	High open society Low closed society	High open society High closed society	Low open society High closed society	Low open society Low closed society
Germany	50	44	3	3
France	41	48	6	5
Italy	29	65	3	3
Hungary	18	73	6	3
Greece	23	68	7	2
Poland	29	58	5	8
All	32	59	5	4

There is a second, very important consequence of this finding. While there are many people who value characteristics that are theoretically more reflective of closed societies, only a small proportion of them reject open society values. Fewer than 10 per cent of respondents in each country fall into box 3 and rate closed society characteristics highly, while not valuing attributes of open societies. Compared to those in box 2, it suggests that a clear majority of people who value closed society characteristics also value open society attributes.

In contrast, those who value open society characteristics highly and rate those of closed societies poorly (box 1), while not the majority (except for Germany where they account for 50 per cent), make up a larger proportion than those in box 3. Even in Hungary, the country with the lowest percentage of people in this group (18), three times more people hold more distinctively positive views of open society characteristics than those in the opposite corner, who only embrace characteristics of closed societies.

Overall, the most common profile is a mix of values associated with open and closed societies. Very few people in any of the countries surveyed hold exclusively closed society values, but there are significant numbers of people at the opposite end who focus strongly on open society values. We therefore need to be very careful in our evaluation of people's social and political attitudes. When we find that a person holds views that may seem to endorse closed societies, we should not assume that this person rejects open society values. On the contrary, they are likely to value several open society characteristics too.

This finding has far-reaching implications for advocacy, policy-making and research on open society attitudes. For advocacy, it implies that campaigns emphasising open society values may fail to counter attitudes supportive of closed society characteristics (and vice versa).

Instead, a more nuanced approach that treats different attitudes separately is needed. For researchers, it means that we cannot use one-dimensional measurements to examine open and closed society attitudes. They need to be measured and examined separately. We cannot assume that we know a person's open society values simply because we know their views on closed society questions.

WHAT MATTERS MOST WHERE? CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISONS

Our analyses show that people who rate one open society attribute as essential are likely to rate another as essential too. Yet some values are uniformly considered more important than others. We find strong similarities across countries at the top and bottom of the rankings (see Table 4).

The attribute most people felt was "absolutely essential" for a good society is freedom of expression. No other attribute was rated higher in any of the six countries. The media's right to criticise the government is also seen as very important: it was ranked second or third highest in all countries.

TABLE 4
Rank order of evaluations for open society values

	RANK BASED ON PERCENTAGE SAYING "ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL" (Percentage in parentheses; higher rank indicates the item was more important)						
	GER	**FRA**	**ITA**	**HUN**	**GRE**	**POL**	**ALL**
Equal treatment for people who recently came to the country	7 (22)	7 (20)	7 (22)	7 (22)	7 (24)	7 (24)	7 (22)
Freedom of religious practice	4 (37)	4 (34)	3 (38)	4 (50)	4 (36)	4 (41)	3 (40)
Freedom of expression of opinion	1 (71)	1 (53)	1 (54)	1 (73)	1 (60)	1 (56)	1 (61)
Government critical groups can engage with government	6 (34)	5 (26)	6 (32)	2 (62)	5 (30)	2 (43)	5 (37)
Protection of minority rights	3 (43)	5 (26)	4 (37)	6 (42)	5 (30)	5 (37)	6 (36)
Representation of all political views in parliament	5 (36)	3 (36)	5 (36)	5 (47)	2 (48)	6 (34)	4 (39)
Media can criticise government	2 (55)	2 (37)	2 (45)	3 (58)	2 (48)	3 (42)	2 (47)

There was also agreement at the other end of the scale. The attribute least often seen as absolutely essential was the equal treatment of recent immigrants. Major systemic freedoms, such as media freedom, were seen as crucial by many, while the protection of rights of minorities was seen as less important, ranking fifth in four of the six countries. It seems that statements that concern minority groups (such as the treatment of new arrivals) are seen as less crucial than statements that include everyone (such as freedom of expression).

There were also noteworthy differences between the countries. Respondents from Poland and Hungary felt strongly that groups critical of the government should be able to engage actively with it. It was ranked the second most essential attribute in both of these countries, while it only came fifth or sixth in the other countries. The importance of political representation was rated differently as well: while it ranked second in Greece and third in France, in Germany, Italy and Hungary, it ranked fifth and sixth in Poland. The specific context in each country appears to shape which open society values people feel particularly strongly about.

WHO IS MORE LIKELY TO SUPPORT VALUES ASSOCIATED WITH OPEN OR CLOSED SOCIETIES?

Country context matters when it comes to how people value an open society and which values they consider most important - but what about socio-demographics, such as age, gender or education levels, or attitudinal factors? Can we identify any differences? How can we identify people who may be more or less likely to hold views associated with an open or closed society, if at all? Are there any determinants to help us do this?

To find out how useful socio-demographic and attitudinal factors are for determining different values, we conducted regression analyses. Given that for many people the two are not opposites, we investigated the profiles separately.

The potential determinants for values of open and closed societies were measured in terms of the open and closed society score we had used in section 1. The summary of results from the regression analyses are shown in tables 5 and 6.[10]

TABLE 5

Characteristics associated with open society scores

Dependent variable: Open society score	GER	FRA	ITA	HUN	GRE	POL
Female		(-)		+		
Age (older)	+		+	+		+
Education (higher)	(+)		+	+	+	+
Civil society organisations represent those otherwise often not heard by politicians (agreement with the statement)	+			+	+	+
Political system focus: Freedom, democracy, self-expression (rather than standard of life, prices, service choices)	+	+	+	+	+	
Migration enriches society (rather than threatens society)	+			(+)	+	
Migration is good for economy (rather than bad for the economy)	+	+	+	+	+	+
Left-right scale self-classification (being more right)	-	-	-		-	-

+/- indicate the direction of statistically significant coefficients (95%-level); Results in parentheses indicate marginally significant results (90%-level); All results from ordinary least squares regressions (full tables in appendix)

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10   The analyses presented are ordinary least squares regressions. Full details are in the online appendix on the project website: http://voicesonvalues.dpart.org

TABLE 6

Characteristics associated with closed society scores

Dependent variable: Closed society score	GER	FRA	ITA	HUN	GRE	POL
Female		-	+			-
Age (older)	+	+	-	+	+	
Education (higher)	-					
Civil Society organisations represent those otherwise often not heard by politicians (agreement with the statement)				(-)		
Political system focus: Freedom, democracy, self-expression (rather than standard of life, prices, service choices)	-	-	-			
Migration enriches society (rather than threatens society)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Migration is good for economy (rather than bad for the economy)	-	-	-	-	-	-
Left-right scale self-classification (being more right)	+	+	+	+	+	+

+/- indicate the direction of statistically significant coefficients (95%-level); Results in parentheses indicate marginally significant results (90%-level); All results from ordinary least squares regressions (full tables in appendix)

Socio-demographic differences

We found substantial differences between countries when it came to determining those likely to have higher open society scores. Education was the most consistent. In five of the six countries, those with higher education levels were more likely to hold stronger open society values. Only in France did there appear to be no significant difference between people with a degree and those without.

Interestingly, the opposite pattern did not apply to the closed society scores. In Germany, we saw the mirror image: those with higher education levels were less likely to hold strong closed society values. But for all other countries, there were no significant differences. This means that closed society values were held both by more and less educated people.

When we looked at age, we found that in Germany, Italy, Hungary and Poland older people tended to have higher open society scores, although this was not the case in France or Greece. Italy was the only country where we observed the reverse: younger people were significantly less likely to hold closed society views.

In France, Greece, Hungary and Germany, older people were more likely to hold closed society views. This means that in Germany and Hungary older people are more likely to hold both stronger open society views and stronger closed society views than younger people. The age profiles differ markedly between countries.

Gender differences were also inconsistent. While women in Hungary were more likely to have higher open society scores than men, they were slightly less likely to do so in France. At the same time, women in France and Poland were significantly less likely than men to hold closed society views. In Italy, by contrast, women were more likely than men to hold closed society views. In Greece and Germany there were no significant gender differences.

What does this tell us? We cannot identify one socio-demographic profile across all six countries for people who value characteristics of open societies more highly. Older people, for instance, may be more likely to hold open society values in some countries, but closed society values in others. Identifying and targeting specific attitudinal groups using demographics is very difficult - if not impossible - in some countries.

This brings us to another finding: in some countries, we can use socio-demographic factors to make fairly confident assumptions about a person's open or closed society tendencies, but not in others. In Germany, for example, education may be a helpful predictor of people's attitudes, but it is unhelpful in France. This means that advocates and policy-makers need to use multi-factor, country-specific approaches to identify and address potential target audiences.

Differences in attitudes

Our questions on people's attitudes were more helpful in determining whether respondents held views reflective of open and closed society characteristics respectively. Attitudes towards migration in particular showed strong levels of association in all six countries. Indeed, across all countries those who thought migration was good for the economy were more likely to hold views associated with open societies and less likely to hold views associated with closed societies.

As well as the economic impact of migration, perceptions about its social impact determined open or closed society attitudes across several countries. Those who thought that migration enriched society were less likely to emphasise the values of closed societies. However, only in some countries

(Germany, Greece and to a lesser extent Hungary) did they also show a significantly higher likelihood of holding stronger open society views.

Another dimension that was mostly consistent across countries was where people situated themselves on the traditional political left-right spectrum. Those who considered themselves to be on the right were more likely to have values associated with closed societies in all six countries, and were less likely to emphasise open society values in five countries (all except Hungary).

There were substantial differences between countries when evaluating the political system and the more general role of organised civil society. In most countries, those who thought the political system should focus on freedom and democracy rather than material wellbeing were more likely to emphasise the values of an open society. This, however, did not apply in Poland. The opposite was true in three countries: in Germany, France and Italy, those who wanted politics to focus on democratic values were less likely to emphasise values reflective of closed societies.

The differences were even more pronounced when we examine the perceived role of civil society organisations. In Hungary, Poland, Greece and Germany those who thought that civil society organisations represent "those who are otherwise not heard" emphasised open society values more. This was not the case in France or Italy, suggesting that the role of organised civil society and the idea of an open society may be perceived differently there.

Interestingly, we did not see an effect in the other direction (except for a small one in Hungary). A positive image of civil society organisations did not relate to a lower likelihood of holding closed society views.

SECTION 1: KEY FINDINGS

The values associated with open societies and closed societies are not opposites. Many people, for example, rate both as highly important for a good society.

While many people value several characteristics reflective of more closed societies, most of them also value several aspects associated with open societies.

Values of open societies and closed societies should be examined separately, and not as opposite extremes on a one-dimensional scale.

Freedom of expression and the right of the media to criticise government were the open society values all countries rated the most highly.

In Hungary and Poland, the right of organisations critical of the government to engage with it was ranked as much more important than in the other countries.

There was no clear socio-demographic profile for people with strong open or closed society values that could be applied to all six countries.

Attitudes to migration and self-classification on the left-right scale were consistent predictors of open or closed society views across countries.

In some countries, views about the political system and the role of civil society organisations were important in identifying people who emphasised values of open societies.

SECTION 2: TRADING OFF OPEN SOCIETY VALUES

WHICH OPEN SOCIETY ATTRIBUTES ARE PEOPLE MOST LIKELY TO TRADE OFF?

We now know that some open society attributes are valued higher than others and that these evaluations may vary across countries. But in real life, values interact. When faced with decisions, people give some values precedence over others. In media and political discourses there is often a notion that people prioritise closed society values when alternative concerns, such as economic security, political stability or the protection of cultural traditions are at stake.

To examine whether that frequent assertion is true and to gain a deeper understanding of how much people value characteristics of an open society, we conducted 14 trade-off experiments (as described in the methodology overview). Comparing the answers to the trade-off questions with people's general evaluations of open society values allowed us to test how consistent respondents were in their evaluation of open society attributes.

Overall, people's evaluations were fairly robust. Those attributes ranked most often as "absolutely essential" in the first part of the survey were also those that people were least likely to trade off when presented with an alternative concern. For example, respondents who said freedom of expression was "absolutely essential" for a good society were unlikely to trade it in for an alternative option, such as "Christian values should not be offended".

Table 7 shows the seven open society attributes, ranked first by the relative importance ascribed to them in the first part of the survey and, then by how often on average people said they would trade these in for an alternative concern, such as economic security, political stability or the protection of cultural traditions.

TABLE 7

Rankings of importance and robustness of open society attributes for all countries

	Ranked by IMPORTANCE (Percentage saying "Absolutely essential")		Ranked by ROBUSTNESS (Percentage trading attribute off on average)
1	Freedom of expression of opinion (61)	**1**	Freedom of expression of opinion (23)
2	Media can criticise government (47)	**2**	Media can criticise government (27)
3	Freedom of religious practice (40)	**3**	Government critical groups can engage with government (38)
4	Representation of all political views in parliament (39)	**4**	Freedom of religious practice (40)
5	Government critical groups can engage with government (37)	**5**	Representation of all political views in parliament (42)
6	Protection of minority rights (36)	**6**	Protection of minority rights (49)
7	Equal treatment for people who recently came to the country (22)	**7**	Equal treatment for people who recently came to the country (53)

The two attributes that were rated most regularly as "absolutely essential" (freedom of expression and the media being able to criticise the government) were on average also those that were least often abandoned for an alternative concern. Those attributes least often considered as essential (the equal treatment of recent immigrants and the protection of minority rights) were also those most often traded off for an alternative. The three other attributes were all very close to each other in terms of percentages of people willing to trade them for another concern.

TABLE 8

Ranking of robustness of open society attributes by country

	RANK BASED ON AVERAGE TIMES THE ATTRIBUTE WAS TRADED OFF FOR AN ALTERNATIVE (Percentage in parentheses; higher rank indicates attribute was less traded off)						
	GER	**FRA**	**ITA**	**HUN**	**GRE**	**POL**	**ALL**
Equal treatment for people who recently came to the country	**7** (48)	**7** (55)	**7** (58)	**7** (59)	**7** (51)	**7** (45)	**7** (53)
Freedom of religious practice	**4** (37)	**5** (43)	**3** (47)	**4** (40)	**4** (44)	**3** (31)	**4** (40)
Freedom of expression of opinion	**1** (14)	**1** (25)	**1** (28)	**1** (21)	**1** (29)	**1** (23)	**1** (23)
Government-critical groups can engage with government	**3** (32)	**3** (38)	**5** (49)	**3** (34)	**4** (44)	**4** (32)	**3** (38)
Protection of minority rights	**5** (45)	**6** (53)	**3** (47)	**6** (56)	**6** (48)	**6** (44)	**6** (49)
Representation of all political views in parliament	**5** (45)	**4** (40)	**6** (53)	**5** (43)	**3** (37)	**5** (38)	**5** (42)
Media can criticise government	**2** (16)	**2** (31)	**2** (33)	**2** (31)	**1** (29)	**2** (25)	**2** (27)

As in our earlier analyses, we see variation across countries, but only for those attributes that are not at the very top or the very bottom of the ranking (table 8). In Greece, for example, people were much less likely to trade off representation of all political views in parliament than respondents in other countries. Interestingly, answers to the trade-off question about government-critical groups being able to engage were more consistent in most countries (often ranked third or fourth), except for Italy, than the simple evaluation of how important that statement was (it was highly ranked only in Poland and Hungary).

SECTION 2: KEY FINDINGS

Assessments of attributes of open societies were robust in all six countries: attributes people considered as more essential generally were also those least likely to be given up when presented with an alternative.

While there were some country variations, the overall patterns applied across all six countries.

SECTION 3: UNDERSTANDING PEOPLE'S TRADE-OFF DECISIONS

TRADE-OFF TYPES: HOW CAN WE UNDERSTAND DIFFERENT EVALUATIONS OF OPEN SOCIETY VALUES?

Our analyses show that we cannot simply place people on a one-dimensional scale with attitudes of open and closed societies at either end. We will therefore differentiate between the two. To develop a typology of different attitudes towards open society values, we focus on the open society dimension in the subsequent analyses.

To analyse the nuances of people's views on open society characteristics, we need instruments to engage with the complex fact that some people who hold open society views may not prioritise these over all other concerns, such as economic security, political stability or the protection of cultural traditions. We distinguished three main groups:

- Those who most commonly prioritise values of open societies, such as freedom of expression, rule of law and respect of human rights over other concerns. We call them *prioritisers* of open society values

- Those who value characteristics of open societies, but who also consider other concerns as being equally important. We call them *sympathisers* with open society values.

- Those who de-prioritise values of open society and tend to trade them off for other concerns instead. We call them *de-prioritisers* of open society values.

Figure 2 shows the percentage of each of these types in the six countries. We distinguished between respondents according to their most common choices in the 14 trade-offs.

If their most common choice was that the open society value was more important than the other concern, we classified them as *prioritisers*. When respondents most commonly favoured the other concern, they were labelled *de-prioritisers*. If they most commonly valued both attributes as equally important, they were labelled *sympathisers*. A small number (7 to 10 per cent of respondents) could not be classified clearly, as they offered no clear pattern (no modal choice).

FIGURE 2

Trade-off types by country (most common option selected in trade-off choices)

	No clear profile	Open Society Prioritiser	Open Society Sympathiser	Open Society De-prioritiser

When comparing countries, we found substantial differences. Poland, Germany and France have significantly higher numbers of *prioritisers* (27 to 30 per cent). However, France also has substantially more *de-prioritisers* (42 per cent), especially compared to Germany (33 per cent) and Poland (32 per cent). Italian respondents showed the highest tendency to trade off characteristics of open societies against other concerns (40 per cent), followed by Hungarians (44 per cent) and Greeks (43 per cent).

Importantly, *sympathisers* – those who consider open society values to be as important for a good society as other concerns – represent a substantial part of the population in each country. This group, commonly ignored in simple one-dimensional classifications, accounts for around one third of people in Greece, Hungary, Poland and Germany. Levels are lower but still significant in Italy (26 per cent) and France (21 per cent).

This is an important insight. Support for the open society in Greece, Hungary and Italy may at first sight appear limited when we focus only on *prioritisers*. In Greece and Hungary, however, the majority of people will not prioritise alternative concerns over values of open societies. In other words, they do not tend to be willing to trade them off. The only country where *de-prioritisers* outnumber the other two groups is Italy.

Overall, there are more people who think that open society values are at least as important as other concerns (such as economic security, political stability or cultural traditions). There may be fewer people who prioritise open society values outright, but that does not mean that they reject them or are happy to trade them off. Only in Italy did those who chose an alternative concern outweigh those who prioritised open society values or those who said both were equally important.

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These insights disprove the assumption that people are either pro- or anti-open society values. Such typologies do not take account of the substantial percentage of *sympathisers* who value open society values but also have other concerns.

WHICH OPEN SOCIETY ATTRIBUTES DO THEY VALUE MOST?

How do *prioritisers*, *sympathisers* and *de-prioritisers* differ on which open society attributes they value most? For a more in-depth understanding of the three types, we investigated their attitudes towards specific open society characteristics. Figure 3 shows the responses to each of the survey's seven characteristics associated with an open society, and compares the three groups' responses.

Unsurprisingly, *prioritisers* were most likely to say that open society values were absolutely essential. *Sympathisers* showed lower levels overall, but were more likely to find characteristics of open societies absolutely essential than *de-prioritisers*.

However, while *sympathisers* were less enthusiastic about open society values than *prioritisers*, rating them more often as "rather essential" instead of "absolutely essential", in most instances they agreed about their importance overall. Combining the positive responses ("absolutely" and "rather essential") showed roughly equal levels of overall support for open society values among *prioritisers* and *sympathisers*.

The only exception was the media's right to criticise government where a small but noteworthy difference exists, with seven per cent more *prioritisers* rating the attribute as essential. Overall *sympathisers* are not less likely to consider open society characteristics as essential for a good society – they just do not consider them quite as essential.

The importance of this insight is clearest when comparing the percentage of those who found attributes associated with open societies either "rather" or "absolutely" essential in these two groups with those who traded off open society attributes for alternatives (the *de-prioritisers*). For all seven attributes, the rating of essentialness is lowest among *de-prioritisers*.

So while *sympathisers* usually agree with *prioritisers* about the overall importance of open society values, their high levels of appraisal clearly distinguish them from *de-prioritisers*. In other words: in their assessment of values associated with open societies, *sympathisers* have much more in common with *prioritisers* than with *de-prioritisers*.

This is most pronounced on the issue of the equal treatment of new immigrants: 80 percent of *sympathisers* find this essential, compared with only 59 percent of *de-prioritisers* (a difference of 21 percentage points). Differences were also obvious when looking at freedom of religious practice (17 percentage points) and the protection of minority rights (15 percentage points). *Sympathisers*, therefore appear particularly distinct from *de-prioritisers* on issues that concern minority rights.

This suggests that *sympathisers* should be seen as likely supporters of the liberal open society – rather than people whose open society values are compromised. Other studies have also identified this group but typically see them as a "movable middle"; people who could be swayed in either direction and become supporters or "enemies" of the open society.

While this may apply to some in this group, their overall tendency clearly positions them closer to the *prioritisers*. We should therefore reject the simplistic characterisation often ascribed to people who do not fit the ideal types at the end of an assumed spectrum. In fact, our research demonstrates that *sympathisers*

are much closer to open society *prioritisers* than to *de-prioritisers*. What distinguishes them from *prioritisers* is not how important they consider open society values, but that they do not see them as more important than other concerns, such as economic security, political stability or cultural traditions.

What does this mean for an open society? First of all, we need to rethink the way we classify people according to their concerns. Someone who believes that Christian values or national traditions must be protected is not, as often assumed, necessarily opposed to open society values or on a slippery slope leading to closed society views.

Secondly, the share of people who rate the values of open societies highly is much larger than commonly portrayed. Across Europe, the dominant discourses focus on societal divisions and increasing polarisation, especially when it comes to migration, and minority and religious rights. While our findings confirm that there are significant differences in attitudes towards open society values, we also find that a large share of people agree on their importance.

FIGURE 3

Evaluation of characteristics associated with open societies by trade-off type

IDENTIFYING TYPES: HOW CAN WE IDENTIFY PRIORITISERS, DE-PRIORITISERS AND SYMPATHISERS?

We have established that people can be divided into three groups based on their evaluations of values associated with open societies vis-à-vis other concerns. We have also established which values each of these groups care about most. Profiles of

people identified as one of the three types can help civil society organisations and policy-makers to develop targeted messages.

We developed these profiles using multinomial regression techniques,[11] which allowed us to check which characteristics tended to be consistently associated with a specific value type. We identified *prioritisers, sympathisers* and *de-prioritisers* based on socio-demographics such as age and gender, as well as attitudes such as attitudes towards migration or party preferences.

TABLE 9
Demographic characteristics

9.1 Age

	YOUNGER		OLDER
GER	P	D	S
FRA	P		S D
ITA	−	−	−
HUN	P		S D
GRE	P		S D
POL	D	P	S

9.2 Education

	Less likely to have a university degree	More likely to have a university degree
GER	D S	P
FRA	−	−
ITA	−	−
HUN	D S	P
GRE	−	−
POL	−	−

9.3 Gender

	More likely to be male	More likely to be female
GER	P D	S
FRA	−	−
ITA	−	−
HUN	−	−
GRE	P	S D
POL	P	S

Key

P Open Society Prioritisers
S Open Society Sympathisers
D Open Society De-prioritisers
− No significant differences

If a group is displayed, it means that they were significantly (at the 10%-level) different from groups displayed elsewhere on the respective scale for that indicator. If a group is not displayed, it was not significantly different from any of those shown for that indicator. If two groups are shown at the same point on the scale, it means that they were not significantly different from each other for that indicator.

11   Full details can be found online http://voicesonvalues.dpart.org

DEMOGRAPHIC PREDICTORS HAVE LIMITED STRENGTH OVERALL, WITH STRONG DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COUNTRIES

When we compared the demographic profiles of the three types across all six countries (table 9), it became clear that demographics are of limited use. There were also substantial differences between countries, suggesting that demographic profiles are quite specific to each country.

Italy is the most extreme example: there were no significant demographic differences between the three groups to help identify which value type a person comes closest to. Factors varied greatly in the other five countries. Education, for example, seemed to matter only in Germany and Hungary – but not to the same degree across all types.

In Germany and Hungary, *prioritisers* tended to be more educated than the other two groups. .

Gender profiles were inconsistent too. There were no gender differences in France, Italy or Hungary. In Greece, women were more likely to be *de-prioritisers* or *sympathisers* than *prioritisers*. In Germany, women were more likely to be *sympathisers* than either of the other two, while in Poland women were more likely to be in the sympathiser group than among the *prioritisers*.

Age profiles also varied substantially. In Greece, Hungary, France and Germany, *de-prioritisers* tended to be older than *prioritisers*. But in Germany, *sympathisers* were even older on average and the oldest group overall. In Greece, Hungary and France, sympathisers tended to be older than *prioritisers*, but not significantly different from *de-prioritisers*. In Poland, *de-prioritisers* tended to be younger than people in the other two groups.

We can conclude that while demographic differences exist between the different types (in all countries except Italy), there is no uniform profile, so we need to be very careful about generalisations based on socio-demographic factors.

This is particularly true on the subject of education, which, with the exception of Germany and in Hungary, cannot be used as a predictor of which group people are more likely to belong to. The limited usefulness of demographics implies that other factors, such as differences in attitudes, need to be considered.

ATTITUDES TOWARDS MIGRATION AND POLITICAL SELF-POSITIONING: THE STRONGEST PREDICTORS

A crucial factor distinguishing *prioritisers* and *sympathisers* from *de-prioritisers* is their view on migration, and more specifically whether people believe migration enriches or threatens society. Interestingly, the economic evaluation of migration – whether people believe migration is good or bad for their country's economy - does not matter as much.

De-prioritisers were more likely to say that migration threatens society than *prioritisers* in all countries except Italy. *De-prioritisers* were also significantly more negative about migration than *sympathisers*. Differences between prioritisers and sympathisers, on the other hand, were not significant, except for Germany.

In other words, *sympathisers* and *prioritisers* share similar views on migration, and both groups are much more positive than those who tend to trade off values associated with open societies. This finding again suggests that *sympathisers* are close to those who are most passionate about open society values, especially when it comes to views on migration and minorities.

Self-positioning on the traditional left-right spectrum was also a helpful and fairly consistent predictor

across countries. Those who considered themselves more to the right of the political spectrum were significantly more likely to be *de-prioritisers* than *prioritisers*. Except in Germany, they were also more likely to be *de-prioritisers* than *sympathisers*. There are substantial differences between prioritisers and sympathisers in Poland and Italy, but not in the other four countries.

TABLE 10
Attitudinal differences

10.1 Migration has a positive effect
(a) Migration & society: Respondent is more/less likely to say that migration enriches society
   (rather than is a threat to society)
(b) Migration & economy: Respondent thinks migration is better/worse for the economy
   (rather than the opposite)

		More likely to see positive impact		Less likely to see positive impact
GER	(a) Migration & society	S	P	D
	(b) Migration & economy	P S		D
FRA	(a) Migration & society	P S		D
	(b) Migration & economy	—		—
ITA	(a) Migration & society	S		D
	(b) Migration & economy	—		—
HUN	(a) Migration & society	P S		D
	(b) Migration & economy	P		D
GRE	(a) Migration & society	P S		D
	(b) Migration & economy	P		D
POL	(a) Migration & society	P S		D
	(b) Migration & economy	—		—

10.2 Evaluation of civil society organisations
Respondent thinks that civil society organisations (CSOs) represent those otherwise not heard

	More likely to see CSOs positively	Less likely to see CSOs positively
GER	S	P D
FRA	S	P D
ITA	—	—
HUN	P S	D
GRE	P S	D
POL	S	P

10.3 Priority of the political system: Material wellbeing or freedom and democracy?
Respondent thinks the political system should be focussed more on freedom and democracy rather than material wellbeing

	More likely to focus on freedom and democracy		Less likely to focus on freedom and democracy
GER	P	S	D
FRA	P		D
ITA	P S		D
HUN	P		D
GRE	—		—
POL	P S		D

10.4 Self-classification on the left-right spectrum

	More left		**More right**
GER	P		S D
FRA	P S		D
ITA	S	P	D
HUN	P S		D
GRE	P S		D
POL	P	S	D

Key

P Open Society Prioritisers

S Open Society Sympathisers

D Open Society De-prioritisers

⊖ No significant differences

If a group is displayed, it means that they were significantly (at the 10%-level) different from groups displayed elsewhere on the respective scale for that indicator. If a group is not displayed, it was not significantly different from any of those shown for that indicator. If two groups are shown at the same point on the scale, it means that they were not significantly different from each other for that indicator.

Whether perceptions of civil society organisations help distinguish between different trade-off groups varies across the six countries. *Sympathisers* were significantly more likely than *de-prioritisers* to see civil society organisations representing those otherwise not heard in Germany, France, Hungary and Greece. In Germany, France and Poland *sympathisers* were more likely to hold positive views than *prioritisers*, while in Hungary and Greece, there were no differences between those two groups, but *prioritisers* were also more likely to evaluate civil society organisations positively compared to *de-prioritisers*. The only country without any significant differences was Italy.

In all countries, except Greece, prioritisers, compared to *de-prioritisers*, were significantly more likely to select freedom and democracy over material wellbeing as the primary focus of the political system. In Germany, Italy and Poland, *sympathisers* also emphasised freedom and democracy more than *de-prioritisers*. While those *sympathisers* showed an equal level of focus on these goals for the political system compared to *prioritisers* in Italy and Poland, in Germany, prioritisers were more likely to do so.

Our analysis shows that in terms of attitudes, in most countries *sympathisers* are closer to *prioritisers* than to *de-prioritisers*. While there are differences in the specific profiles of what matters most when identifying them, we found in particular that attitudes to migration provided a consistent factor that helped us distinguish between different priority types.

While *sympathisers* share the same positive views as *prioritisers*, they are very different from *de-prioritisers*, who are more likely to see migration as a threat. Overall, the findings confirm our earlier insights: we should regard *sympathisers* as potential supporters of open societies, alongside the *prioritisers*.

SECTION 3: KEY FINDINGS

We can distinguish between people who tend to prioritise open society values over potential other concerns (*prioritisers*), from those who will easily trade them off (*de-prioritisers*). In addition, there is an important third group (*sympathisers*) who often find open society values as important as other concerns, such as economic security, political stability or cultural traditions.

Sympathisers are clearly distinguishable from *de-prioritisers* in the importance they give to the protection of minority rights (such as the treatment of new immigrants or the freedom of religion), where they show much more positive views (such as the treatment of new immigrants or the freedom of religion).

The three groups are not clearly identifiable using demographic data in any of the six countries. The demographic profiles differ substantially.

If we compare the attitudes of the three different profile groups, we find that *sympathisers* are much closer to *prioritisers* than to *de-prioritisers*, particularly in their attitudes towards migration, their self-positioning within the political system and the way they assess political systems. However, there are also substantial differences between countries in the precise profile configuration.

CONCLUSION

Two types of people are frequently presented in public and media debates about values: "cosmopolitans" who passionately support open society values, versus "traditionalists" who oppose them and support traditional family values.

Our research shows that these dichotomous typologies are inaccurate, because for most people open and closed society views are not mutually exclusive. In other words, a substantial group of people considers both open and closed society values as important for a good society. These different sets of views cannot be understood as part of a one-dimensional scale and should not be presented as opposites. Importantly, while there are many people who value closed society aspects, over 90 per cent of them also value several values of open societies. Only 5 per cent of people exclusively value closed society ideals.

To distinguish the levels of support for different sets of values, we need to evaluate each dimension in its own right. This implies that next to *prioritisers* of open society values and *de-prioritisers* who tend to trade them off, we need to consider a third group: *sympathisers*. These are people who value open society attributes, but show equal consideration for other concerns, such as economic security, political stability or cultural traditions.

Contrary to studies that recognise the existence of a "middle group" as sitting neutrally between open and closed society values, we suggest that many people should not be seen as easily "movable" between values, but as people who firmly believe in the importance of an open society. In other words, most *sympathisers* are not less convinced of the importance of open society values than *prioritisers* are.

This becomes particularly clear when we compare how *sympathisers* and *de-prioritisers* assess different values associated with open societies; the former consider these to be substantially more important. *Sympathisers* are particularly distinguishable from *de-prioritisers* in how they view minority protections, such as equal treatment of new arrivals, freedom of religion and overall protection of minority rights, where they have much more positive views.

These findings have important implications for policy-makers, civil society organisations and other actors seeking ways to convince people "in the middle" or those voicing concerns about national security or the protection of national values. We find many of them do not need convincing, and that attempts to do so might be counterproductive. The goal should not be to make *sympathisers* abandon their concerns or consider other values as less important. Instead they should be considered as supporters of an open society, whose other concerns need to be addressed better when discussing open society values.

Strategies to work with *sympathisers* should not imply that their concerns are opposed to the open society values they believe in. Put simply, *sympathisers* do not need to be "moved". Instead, they need to be engaged with where they stand, which means that they should not be mischaracterised as potential "enemies" of an open society.

Of the open society attributes we examined, respondents in all six countries valued freedom of expression and the right of the media to criticise governments the most. This is a particularly important finding at a time when several countries are considering legislative proposals to regulate 'fake

news', and when countries such as Hungary have implemented measures that restrict both freedom of expression and freedom of the press.

It is reassuring that overall assessments of open society attributes are robust across all six countries, and that attributes people consider as more essential are usually the same ones they were least likely to exchange for other concerns. This shows us that open society values are not just considered important in absolute but also in relative terms; the evaluations of their importance appear robust.

As for identifying *prioritisers*, *de-prioritisers* and *sympathisers*, we find that things are more complex than often portrayed. Contrary to media coverage that uses socio-demographic profiles to explain the success of right-wing parties or policies (think of the stereotype of the elderly male with low education levels), our research demonstrates that there are no such clear-cut profiles. No single demographic factor – age, gender or education level – can serve as a good predictor of support for open or closed society values.

Equally, no clear socio-demographic profile of *prioritisers*, *sympathisers* or *de-prioritisers* is applicable to all six countries. This means that we must be careful about making generalisations based on demographics. Demographics on who is more likely to hold open or closed society views vary considerably between countries as well. This implies that, where applicable at all, demographics need to be country-specific in order to be useful tools for targeting techniques.

Attitudes are more suitable indicators of where a person stands in relation to views about an open society. Both attitudes towards migration, and political self-classification on the left-right scale, varied considerably between those with strong views on open or closed society characteristics across all countries. How people evaluate political systems (whether they focus more on certain rights or on economic factors), as well as how they evaluate the role of civil society organisations, are helpful in identifying open society value profiles in some countries, but not in all of them.

What does all this mean for open societies in Europe? We need to stop thinking of open society attitudes in black-and-white terms - as people being either for or against an open society. Most Europeans do not think in such dichotomising terms.

This requires a rethink among those trying to protect values associated with open societies. Instead of preaching to the already converted while neglecting many people's concerns about economic security, political stability or cultural traditions, policy-makers and civil society organisations should find ways to engage open society *sympathisers*.

If we think of *sympathisers* as (potential) supporters of open society values and consider that they account on average for 30 per cent of the population, this means that those who hold values associated with open societies outweigh those who do not. Put simply: open societies have more friends than is commonly assumed, but it is up to those seeking to protect them to leverage that support.

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Dr Jan Eichhorn, Founding partner and research director at d|part

Jan coordinated the design of the *Voices on Values* project and oversaw the research. He holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of Edinburgh and a BA in Integrated Social Sciences from Jacobs University Bremen. In addition to his research work, Jan is a Senior Lecturer in Social Policy at the University of Edinburgh.

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Magali is head quantitative researcher on the *Voices on Values* project. Before joining d|part, she was a business consultant in a market research company in London. She is also project coordinator at the Foundation FUTURZWEI. Magali holds a BA in European Studies from Maastricht University and an MSc in Global Migration from University College London.